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ABSTRACT 
 
Cloud computing represents a revolutionary service model for accessing information 
technology (IT) services, and an opportunity for governments to reduce maintainance costs of IT 
infrastructure. However, relying on commercial cloud services may prove challenging for privacy 
and security if cloud service providers cannot guarantee adequate standards for their services.  
In this thesis, I analyze four IT security standards comparing them alongside each other. 
ISO/IEC 27001 and SOC 2 are two international IT frameworks issued by non-government 
organizations and available since 2005. FedRAMP and C5 are two more recent cloud-specific 
standards, respectively issued by the US and German governments. 
Examining the four standards in comparison, and evaluating their completeness and 
adequacy in guaranteeing information assurance in cloud environments, I question whether they 
really represent an improvement in cloud security, what are their shortcomings, and ultimately the 
necessity of new cloud security standards in the already crowded IT security landscape.  
I combine a broad contextual analysis with empirical results to help understand the reasons 
for creating C5, and shed lights on its role in the EU political agenda.   
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The impact of information technology (IT) on today’s business and everyday life is greater 
than ever before. Remote access to information and computational resources are necessary to 
efficiently perform job activities, financial transactions, or access personal communications. With 
the diffusion of cloud computing – known as the “model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-
demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources” (NIST, 2011) – an 
evolution in our approach to IT usage is occuring. Not only are software resources more easily 
accessible over the internet, but enhanced hardware capabilities and computational resources have 
also become available remotely, based on commercial service providers’ IT infrastructure. An 
increased number of opportunities, however, corresponds to higher risks for security and privacy 
of remote systems-based applications. Cyber-treats, such as malicious insiders, account hijacking, 
or denial of service (DoS) attacks, have driven attention and concern of governments and the IT 
industry, engaged in finding new solutions to maximize benefits of cloud computing without 
suffering of its risks. When privacy and security of information are affected by cyber-threats, 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability (C-I-O) might be compromised, and information trust be 
at stake. Governments, industry, as well as private citizens can experience data leaks and financial 
losses. To find shelter against potential threats, attention to improving existing IT security 
standards – or if necessary creating new ones – has captured considerable effort and resources. 
The European Union (EU) and the United States (US) represent a bulwark in standardization of 
security measures and risk management. Yet, differences among the adopted standards and lack 
of mutual recognition create substantial confusion in the access to IT-based services, and leads to 
an increased burden on service providers. This is even more striking in consideration of the 
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enormous amount of information exchanged across the Atlantic. With a combined total of more 
than 44% and 32% respectively in exports and imports shares in 2014, the two blocks are at the 
leaders of world trade value in commercial services (WTO, 2015), with the consequent volume of 
data that needs to be transferred between the US and the EU. However, lack of interoperability of 
security standards leads to a decrease in efficiency. Where certification or authorization 
mechanisms are required to operate in a certain country or area (as for providing IT services to the 
US government, or specific services in the EU, such as electronic document preservation), a de 
facto compliance could not be enough. At the same time, the existence of different standards 
concurring to the same goal might be detrimental for competition. Only those organizations able 
to afford multiple certifications could meet the higher security requirements, thus penalizing 
smaller organization and affecting variety and quality of IT offer.  
Referring to harmonization of IT security measures in the Single Market,1 the European 
Commission, the executive arm of the EU, has metaphorically defined the whole set of existing 
standards and certifications as a “jungle” (Gleeson and Walden, 2014). Cloud security 
certifications grow from common roots, facing same issues and using similar security measures. 
However, they have extended their branches in slightly different direction in the last few years, in 
a stratification that aims at protecting security and trust, but often rises confusion and burdens for 
service providers and users of the services. Among the most relevant IT security standards, 
ISO/IEC 27001 is available since 2005, year of its first publication. It was updated in 2013 to keep 
pace with IT innovation and respond to newer threats, and counts more than 27,000 valid 
certificates worldwide as for 2015 (ISO, 2015). The standard specifies guidelines and requirements 
                                                 
1 The European Single Market “refers to the EU as one territory without any internal borders or other regulatory 
obstacles to the free movement of goods and services” (European Commission, 2017a).  
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to establish, implement, and maintain information security management systems. Another 
international standard, first issued in 2011 by the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA), is SOC 2. The standard is based on an extensive list of trust services 
principles and criteria (TSPC), also issued by AICPA, and derives its structure from the SAS 70 
report, a reporting standard created to assure the integrity of financial statements.  SOC 2 evolved 
from SAS 70 focusing on privacy and security measures implemented in IT systems. In 2011, 
instead of embracing or building on existing standards, the US government issued its own list of 
security requirements. The Federal Risk Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP) limits 
its perimeter to cloud service providers (CSPs) to the Federal Government. CSPs are required to 
receive an authorization from the FedRAMP Joint Authorization Board (JAB)2 and comply with 
FedRAMP control requirements to offer cloud services to Federal Agencies. As for March 2017, 
only 79 service providers are FedRAMP authorized (FedRAMP, 2017a), and more than one third 
of them are already ISO/IEC 27001 certified. After its first release, FedRAMP was reviewed in 
2015 with additional controls, and completed in 2016 with the introduction of a high security 
baseline for more sensitive information.  
In the EU, at the same time, the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI 
- the German Federal Office for Information Security) issued its own set of controls, aimed to 
assess information security of cloud services. The Cloud Computing Compliance Controls 
Catalogue (C5) published early 2016 integrates controls from the major certification schemes, 
including ISO/IEC 27001 and SOC 2, but not FedRAMP. It supplies to missing controls from 
existing frameworks, or integrates the ones deemed to be incomplete. Although C5 is not meant to 
                                                 
2 The JAB members are the Chief Information Officer from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), General 
Services Administration (GSA), and Department of Defense (DOD). The JAB is supported by Office of Management 
and Budget Policy (OMB), CIO Council, and NIST (FedRAMP, 2017b). 
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be a certification, but rather a checklist and a set of guidelines for cloud security auditors to break 
on through the jungle of standards described by the European Commission, what it does is adding 
another standard to the list of existing IT security frameworks. 
The narrative emerging from the past few years brings several questions. Is a new 
framework ultimately necessary? What increased protection can a standard such as C5 guarantee 
that others cannot? What is the purpose of adding another security standard to a crowded group of 
international and national certifications? Why does C5 recognize the ISO/IEC 27001 and SOC 2, 
while it overlooks FedRAMP? 
This thesis aims to respond to these questions, compare the effectiveness of C5 to other 
existing standards, and identify possible areas of improvement. Additionally, it clarifies its relation 
with FedRAMP, SOC 2, and ISO/IEC 27001 in control area and controls addressed by the four 
standards, while looking to the role and goals of the European Commission and the US government 
in the adoption of these standards3. 
1.1. Research Contribution to the Field 
Previous work on standards have explained the reasons behind standardization, and the 
effects of standards on society. The idea of standards as legislative acts justifies their role and 
potential in driving change in the society by creating a set of ruled drafted by experts. Narrowing 
down the attention to the literature on IT standards, previous work appears limited to the analysis 
                                                 
3 Notably the European Commission, through the support of DG Connect, promotes cloud computing initiatives under 
the European Cloud Strategy 2012, formally initiated with the publication of the communication No. 529 (2012) 
“Unleashing the Potential of Cloud Computing in Europe” (European Commission, 2012). In the US, the promotion 
of cloud security falls under the broader “cloud First Strategy (Kundra, 2011), first issued by the CIO council 
supported by the OMB. The strategy gives a strong signal to federal agencies about the necessity of moving to cloud 
technology promoting efficiency and security of information. 
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and comparison of security standards attempting to guarantee information assurance in IT systems, 
without trying to clarify the role of existing standards in a “bigger picture” incorporating an 
evolving political, normative, and societal context. Similarly, previous studies on cloud threats, 
although receptive to the risks associated with the use of cloud technologies and proposing 
technical remedies, have not offered sufficient elements to integrate their conclusions in the 
existing security standards adopted by the IT industry. This thesis aims at filling those gaps by 
combining a review of FedRAMP 2015, SOC 2, C5, ISO/IEC 27001:2013, and a broader 
contextualization of the standards in the political, legislative, and societal landscape. 
Building on the results from previous studies (Di Giulio et al., 2017, 2017a), I propose an 
analysis of how missing controls result in potential threats to cloud services, and I explore the 
evolution of these standards by looking at their completeness and effectiveness overtime. Besides 
clearly stated goals (i.e. information assurance in IT environments), the function of standards such 
as C5, ISO/IEC 27001, SOC 2, or FedRAMP can be adequately assessed only by measuring the 
improvement they are able to bring to cloud assurance. The technical analysis helps gauging the 
effectiveness of existing cloud security standards comparing them alongside each other, while also 
exploring how resilient the standards are in the face of a dynamic threat landscape. At the same 
time, a thorough analysis of the international context and the different approaches to privacy and 
cybersecurity in the US and the EU helps to address and understand the relevance and function of 
the existing standards. Regulatory measures, policies, and soft law are all instruments contributing 
to build the identity of each institutional block. Standards as legislative acts are one of those 
instruments, and must be looked in context to be correctly understood. 
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CHAPTER 2: IT SECURITY STANDARDS4 
Standards are pervasive in our life, and standardization – the effect of complying with a 
standard – has a double function on the market of goods and services. On one hand, standards 
make users’ life easier, creating the conditions for commercial products or services to meet users’ 
expectations. That is because, when products or services are compliant with a standard, their 
characteristics are generally well-known to the public, and users are aware of their features, 
capabilities, and limits as well. On the other hand, standards can be adopted to guarantee baseline 
protection in subjects including, but not limited to consumer’s rights, personal data protection, and 
business competition. For example, food safety standards aim to ensure higher quality of food 
products, establish safety for human consumption, and at the same time reassure consumers on the 
production processes adopted by the food industry. The existing literature offers a variety of 
definitions on what a standard is and what are its functions. In this chapter, I give an overview of 
definitions, functions, and characteristics of standards with a focus on FedRAMP, ISO/IEC 27001, 
SOC 2, and C5. 
2.1. Standards as Legislative Acts 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) offers an extensive definition 
of what a standard is, and operates a distinction depending on the source of the standard and its 
function. First “technical standards” detail the specifics of products or materials, including the 
                                                 
4 This Chapter includes material from previously published work. See Di Giulio, C., Sprabery, R., Kamhoua, C., 
Kwiat, K. Campbell, R., Bashir, M. (forthcoming 2017). “Cloud Security Certifications: A Comparison to Improve 
Cloud Service Provider Security”. In the proceedings of the Second International Conference on Internet of Things, 
Data and Cloud Computing (ICC 2017), Churchill College, Cambridge, UK. March 22-23, 2017. ACM Proceedings 
Series 
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procedures for their management. The second group are “voluntary standards,” those not imposed 
by existing laws or regulations. Third are “non-government” standards, which are those applied in 
spite of missing enforcement measures by the authorities. Last are “performance standards,” which 
do not specify details on products and materials, such as in the case of technical standards, but 
rather specify the result that must be achieved (NIST, 1998). The International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) provides a more general definition, referring to a standard as “a document 
that provides requirements, specifications, guidelines or characteristics that can be used 
consistently to ensure that materials, products, processes and services are fit for their purpose” 
(ISO, 2017). In brief, a standard can be defined as a prescription of procedures and methods to 
achieve a given goal. Although the distinction made by NIST of voluntary or non-government 
standards (which implies the existence of required standards and those created by governments) 
suggests different strength of a standard depending on its formal value, normative power of a 
standard is often unrelated to it. 
Although standards and guidelines cannot be properly defined as norms, their relevance as 
regulatory tools and effective drivers for change is well recognized in the literature. Brunsson and 
Jacobsson (2000) list three possible types of rule: norms, directives and standards. Norms are 
intended as socially recognized and internalized rules. Norms do not require enforcement by 
external powers, and individuals comply with them by their own will. Directives are written rules, 
issued by authorities, and generally accompanied by enforcement measures and sanctions. 
Standards are the third category, inclusive of explicit rules with no reference to authorities in 
charge of enforcement measures and sanctions (Brunsson and Jacobsson, 2000, p.13). However, 
despite being often promulgated by non-government bodies, their endorsement by governments 
and their direct reference in legislative acts – those which Brunsson and Jacobsson refer to as 
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“directives”— make them as effective as legislative acts. The ISO/IEC 27000 series, for instance, 
is issued by a non-government organization. The EU Implementing Regulation 2015/1502, setting 
out technical specifications and procedures according to the EU Regulation 910/2013 on e-
identification and trust services, points out to the ISO 27000 series as guidance for the adoption of 
information security management systems. At a national level, a more specific example can be 
found in rules for long-terms storage of electronic documents with preservation of their legal 
validity. For example, the Italian national agency for digitalization (Agenzia per l’Italia Digitale 
– AgID) has made clear how service providers are required to be certified against ISO/IEC 
27001:2013 before being able to offer such a service to the public.5  
2.2. What Is Behind Standards? 
The main reason why governments rely on standards and consider them legitimate to 
dictate technical requirements is that standards are crafted by experts (Brunsson and Jacobsson, 
2000, p. 40). The formalization of experts’ opinions through standards represents a means to create 
a “repository” of knowledge (Brunsson & Jacobsson 2000, p. 42), and serves the purpose of 
reducing case-by-case consultations with credentialed professional by embedding authority in 
written rules (Timmermans and Epstein, 2010). However, not always are experts extraneous to the 
industry, which would make the definition of common practices and guidelines derive exclusively 
from proactive actions of expert groups or governments, but they can be industry stakeholders, 
thus making standards a consequence of market self-regulation. Dombalagian notes how “direct 
standard-setting by regulatory bodies may suffer from poor information about the industry and its 
                                                 
5 Circular N.65, April 10, 2014. Procedures for accreditation and supervision of public and private subjects providing 
electronic document storage in compliance with article 44-bis, clause 1 of the legislative decree 82, March 7, 2005 
(My translation. Original text: Circolare n.65 del 10 aprile 2014 – Modalità per l’accreditamento e la vigilanza sui 
soggetti pubblici e private che svolgono attività di conservazione dei documenti informatici di cui all’articolo 44-bis, 
comma 1, del decreto legislativo 7 marzo 2005, n.82). 
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technical capabilities and cumbersome administrative processes and judicial review” (2015, p. 
123). For the sake of market efficiency “[r]egulators generally intervene in standard-setting only 
when informational intermediaries and industry bodies lack the incentive to develop adequate 
standards or cannot internalize positive externalities” (Dombalagian, 2015, p. 123). As a 
consequence, governments may find convenient to allow self-regulation as the benefits deriving, 
on one hand, from fast competition, and on the other hand from skillful decisions, are greater than 
dictating their own terms.  
In some situations, however, the authorities could be better off leading the standard 
building process. These cases are particularly those where divergent interests between government 
and industry might result in detriment for consumers or competition and equal access to markets6. 
Shapiro (2003) argues that governments cannot justify the standards determined in autonomy by 
the industry because of their transactional costs. Although governments might initially save time 
and money in delegating the definition of a standard to private parties letting the market free to 
determine their own best practices, since private actors tend to engage in opportunistic behavior, 
divergence of interests is more likely to increase the costs in a later moment (Shapiro, 2003, p. 
407). A possible consequence is that governments will be forced to intervene with additional 
burdens on producers and users as well. Shapiro presents his idea of increasing transational costs 
as generally applicable. However, the unbalance between government and business interests 
mostly depends on policies, political, and ideological orientation. For example, transactional costs 
of data protection in the EU may be very likely to increase when governments leaves the industry 
                                                 
6 An example of conflicting interests between government and industry in the EU is the use of personally identifiable 
information (PII) for commercial purposes. On the one hand, the best interest for consumers is to keep their data 
private. On the other hand, businesses prefer less limitations to their use and be able to sell and buy PII for marketing 
and commercial purposes.  
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free to determine its best practices. In the EU, the idea of privacy as a human right conflicts with 
business interests to use personal information for commercial purposes. Protecting privacy once 
markets have opted for free data flow might be costly, and still insufficient to guarantee full 
protection.7 The same issue can be seen from the opposite angle in the US, where the Government 
tends to be more supportive for business initiative versus private interests. Privacy is considered 
as a civil right, and personal data are progressively going towards commoditization.8 In that case, 
government and business interests coincide, thus making transactional costs less likely to increase 
in the near future. 
In addition to increasing transactional costs, market self-regulation can lead to a variety of 
problems, including lack of coordination among stakeholders or generate a lock-in effect.  
First, lack of coordination, is the result of a failure in achieving full self-regulation, where 
multiple solutions are adopted to address the same issue, missing to create a standardization across 
the market. An example is the evolution of mobile chargers. Until 2009, a wide variety of chargers 
incompatible with other devices was adopted from the major mobile phone producers, accounting 
for 51,000 tons of redundant charges every year (IEC, 2011). Environmental concern, and 
inconvenience for users pushed the European Commission to ask for harmonization in the 
European Single Market. Ten major producers signed the related Memorandum of Understanding 
issued by the Commission, leading to the market-wide adoption of micro-USB charger as default 
charger, as recommended in the IEC Standard 62684:20119 (European Commission, 2009). As 
                                                 
7 An exemple is the application of the “Right to be Forgotten” in the EU. See section 3.5. 
8 Privacy protection standards in the US were drastically lowered in March 2017, when the current administration 
repealed the existing rules requiring higher control of consumers on their data and preventing internet service providers 
to sell browsing data to third parties (Freking, 2017).  
9 The standard is titled: Interoperability specifications of common external power supply (EPS) for use with data-
enabled mobile telephones 
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shown in the example, the creation of Standards dictated from actors external to the market (in the 
example the European Commission) can force towards uniformity and solve the impasse.  
Second, the lock-in effect, may happen when the most powerful actors on the market 
propose and then adopt a common solution, and hence force the market to uniform. Even in the 
case of a poor or perfectible solution, it might become impossible for more innovative and efficient 
ideas to gain relevance, like in an abuse of dominant position. An example of standardization to 
avoid lock-in effect can be recognized in the adoption of OpenDocument (ODF) file format (e.g. 
file with extension: .odt, .ods, .odp) as an ISO standard. The format is adopted for a variety of 
applications, including word processors, spreadsheets, and presentations. Concurrent was the 
adoption – although with significant doubts on interference of the industry leader in the 
standardization process10 – of the Office Open XML file format (e.g. file with extension .docx, 
.xlsx, pptx). The wide predominance of proprietary formats produced with the Microsoft Office 
suite (e.g. file with extension .doc, .xls, .ppt) came to a halt in 2006 with the publication of the 
ISO/IEC 26300:2006 standard “Open Document Format for Office Applications.” Only two years 
later, ISO/IEC published the 29500:2008 standard, based on Microsoft’s proprietary format Office 
Open XML. After their recognition, the ISO/IEC Joint Technical Committee (JTC) 1 Information 
Technologies is in in charge of maintenance of the standards’ specifications. The result of the 
standardization process was to reach interoperability between documents produced on multiple 
platforms, including Open Source applications (such as OpenOffice) and Microsoft Office.  
As shown in the last example, the risk of a lock-in effect can justify the creation and 
formalization of new standards removing the conditions for self-regulation (i.e. existing standards) 
                                                 
10 The European Commission casted doubts on Microsoft violating Anti-Trust Law to obtain recognition of the 
proprietary format Office Open XML as an international standard from the ISO/IEC (Forelle, 2008). 
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to allow equal access conditions to the market (Brunsson and Jacobsson, 2010). An identical 
reason can justify constant update of standards. The update can be promoted to reflect changes in 
requirements, as well as changes in market conditions. Echoing Brunsson and Jacobsson, 
Dombalagian argues that, in absence of updates following changes to market conditions, a lock-in 
effect in favor of well-established actors at the expense of new competitors is likely to happen, and 
updating old standards creates the potential of further changes and positive contributions (2015, p. 
124).  
In the EU and the US, some government agencies have a direct involvement in the creation 
of standards. This is the case of FedRAMP and C5, and in the example of FedRAMP, compliance 
with the standard has a direct effect on the CSP’s ability to offer services to federal agencies. If in 
some instances the provisions in the standards can assume a direct normative value (e.g. for a CSP 
offering services to the Federal Government), they represent mere guidelines or recommendations 
in others (e.g. a CSP offering services to private tenants only). Still, lack of direct normative value 
for a certain group does not imply a lesser relevance of the standard. By defining a set of 
requirements, the authorities make a statement about the existence of multiple baselines. In the 
specific example of FedRAMP and cloud security, the creation of a detailed set of security 
measures implies a higher security baseline required for federal contractors. CSPs not contracting 
with federal agencies are free whether complying with the standard or not. However, being 
FedRAMP authorized may give them a commercial advantage over the competitors, as it means 
that the certified CSPs respect higher security standards, thus making them more appealing for 
private tenants as well. 
13 
 
Regardless of their source and statutory value, standards are meant to prescribe rules of 
behavior, procedures or general requirements. The prescription can assume various forms, and a 
standard can be organized in general clauses or guidelines, or in more stringent requirements, for 
instance included in a checklist of controls as in the case of ISO/IEC 27001, SOC 2, FedRAMP, 
or C5.  
2.3. The IT Security Standards 
The four standards subject of this study present a similar structure and share similar goals. 
ISO/IEC 27001 relates to risk management and security requirements in IT environments.11 SOC 
2 is aimed at promoting confidentiality, integrity, availability, and security in service 
organizations.12 FedRAMP and C5 serve similar functions, by setting security requirements in the 
specific context of cloud environments. FedRAMP limits its scope to the Federal Government, 
whereas C5 is broader and serves as a generic guideline to promote cloud security. All the four 
standards are organized in control families – homogeneous groups of controls overseeing the same 
area – each one of which covers a relevant topic in information assurance (Table 2.1). Compliance 
with the controls in those sections is meant to be verified by specialized auditors, as the result of a 
thorough assessment of IT infrastructure, internal policies and procedures of the CSP. However, 
the standard can be used as a guideline for best practices in IT security. With the controls serving 
as a model, audits can be performed for a formal assessment allowing the CSP to obtain a 
certification or authorization, or by CSP’s employees with the purpose of merely verify 
compliance with the guidelines and the implementation of baseline security. 
                                                 
11 The full rubric of the most recent version of the standard is: ISO/IEC 27001:2013 The Information technology—
Security techniques— Information security management systems—Requirements 
12 The rubric of SOC 2 is “Report on Controls at a Service Organization Relevant to Security, Availability, Processing 
Integrity, Confidentiality or Privacy” 
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Table 2.1: List of Control Families in FedRAMP, ISO/IEC 27001, C5, and SOC 2 
FedRAMP rev4 (2015) ISO/IEC 27001:2013 BSI C5 SOC 2 (TSPC 2016) 
AC - Access Control (43 
controls) 
A.5: Information security 
policies (2 controls) 
UP - Framework Conditions 
of the cloud Service (4 
controls) 
CC1.0 Common Criteria 
Related to Organization and 
Management 
AT - Awareness and Training 
(5 controls) 
A.6: Organization of 
information security (7 
controls) 
OIS - Organization of 
Information Security (7 
controls) 
CC2.0 Common Criteria 
Related to Communication 
AU - Audit and 
Accountability (20 controls) 
A.7: Human resource security 
(6 controls) 
SA – Security policies and 
Work Instructions (3 controls) 
CC3.0 Common Criteria 
Related to Risk Management 
and Design and 
Implementation of Controls 
CA - Security Assessment 
and Authorization (15 
controls) 
A.8: Asset management (10 
controls) 
HR – Personnel (5 controls) CC4.0 Common Criteria 
Related to Monitoring of 
Controls 
CM - Configuration 
Management (26 controls) 
A.9: Access control (14 
controls) 
AM – Asset Management (8 
controls) 
CC5.0 Common Criteria 
Related to logical and 
Physical Access Controls 
CP - Contingency Planning 
(24 controls) 
A.10: Cryptography (2 
controls) 
PS - Physical Security (5 
controls) 
CC6.0 Common Criteria 
Related to System Operations 
IA - Identification and 
Authentication (27 controls) 
A.11: Physical and 
environmental security (15 
controls) 
RB – Safeguards for regular 
Operations (23 controls) 
CC7.0 Common Criteria 
Related to Change 
Management 
IR - Incident Response (18 
controls) 
A.12: Operations security (14 
controls) 
IDM – Identity and Access 
Management (13 controls) 
A1.0 Additional Criteria for 
Availability 
MA - Maintenance (11 
controls) 
A.13: Communications 
security (7 controls) 
KRY – Cryptography and 
Key Management (4 controls) 
PI1.0 Additional Criteria for 
Processing Integrity 
MP - Media Protection (10 
controls) 
A.14: System acquisition, 
development and maintenance 
(13 controls) 
KOS – Communication 
Security (8 controls) 
C1.0 Additional Criteria for 
Confidentiality 
PE - Physical and 
Environmental Protection (20 
controls) 
A.15: Supplier relationships 
(5 controls) 
PI – Portability and 
Interoperability (5 controls) 
P1.0 Privacy Criteria Related 
to Notice and Communication 
of Commitments and System 
Requirements 
PL - Planning (6 controls) A.16: Information security 
incident management (7 
controls) 
BEI – Procurement, 
Development and 
Maintenance of Information 
systems (12 controls) 
P2.0 Privacy Criteria Related 
to Choice and Consent 
PS - Personnel Security (9 
controls) 
A.17: Information security 
aspects of business continuity 
management (4 controls) 
DLL – Control and 
Monitoring of Service 
Providers and suppliers (2 
controls) 
P3.0 Privacy Criteria Related 
to Collection 
RA - Risk Assessment (10) A.18: Compliance; with 
internal requirements, such as 
policies, and with external 
requirements, such as laws (8 
controls) 
SIM – security Incident 
Management (7 controls) 
P4.0 Privacy Criteria Related 
to Use, Retention, and 
Disposal 
SA - System and Services 
Acquisition (22 controls) 
 BCM – Business Continuity 
Management (5 controls) 
P5.0 Privacy Criteria Related 
to Access 
SC - System and 
Communications Protection 
(32 controls) 
 SPN – Security Check and 
Verification (3 controls) 
P6.0 Privacy Criteria Related 
to Disclosure and Notification 
SI - System and Information 
Integrity (28 controls) 
 COM – Compliance and Data 
Protection (3 controls) 
P7.0 Privacy Criteria Related 
to Quality 
  MDM – Mobile Device 
Management (1 control)  
P8.0 Privacy Criteria Related 
to Monitoring and 
Enforcement 
Sources: NIST, 2013; ISO/IEC, 2013; BSI, 2016; AICPA, 2016. 
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Controls in the three standards are provided as a textual description of security measures, 
procedural requirements, and best practices that the CSP must implement (Table 2.2). Coverage 
of all the controls should guarantee full security of the system certified against the standard, and 
protect against the most common threats to cloud environments. 
Table 2.2: Example of controls in the four standards 
Name of the Standard Content of the control (Section and reference) 
FedRAMP rev. 4 (2015) 
The organization develops, documents, and implements a configuration management plan 
for the information system that: a. Addresses roles, responsibilities, and configuration 
management processes and procedures (…) (CM-9) 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 
Management shall actively support security within the organization through clear direction, 
demonstrated commitment, explicit assignment, and acknowledgment of information 
security responsibilities (A.6.1.1) 
SOC 2 (TSPC 2016) 
The entity has defined organizational structures, reporting lines, authorities, and 
responsibilities for the design, development, implementation, operation, maintenance, and 
monitoring of the system enabling it to meet its commitments and system requirements (…). 
(CC1.1) 
BSI C5 
(…) On the part of the cloud provider, at least the following roles (…) are described in the 
security policy or associated policies and corresponding responsibilities assigned: (…). 
Changes to the responsibilities and interfaces are communicated internally and externally in 
(…) a timely manner (…). (OIS-03) 
Sources: NIST, 2013; ISO/IEC, 2013; BSI, 2016; AICPA, 2016. 
In spite of their similarities, however, the four standards are not equivalent. Each one has 
its own distinctive characteristics and operates in a specific context, and being compliant with one 
standard does not guarantee compliance with the others as well. In the following sections, I give 
an overview of the four standards, their development, and main differences among them. 
2.3.1. ISO/IEC 27001 
The ISO/IEC 27001 is a technical standard for “establishing, implementing, maintaining 
and continually improving an information security management system” (ISO/IEC, 2013) of any 
organization in the private or public sector (ISO, 2017b). The ISO/IEC 27001 is a joint effort of 
two different bodies, the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), and the 
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). ISO is a non-governmental organization that 
16 
 
works through 162 national standards bodies around the world (ISO, 2017a).  IEC is a non-profit, 
quasi-governmental organization structured in National Committees, which members are experts 
from national organizations, industry, academia, and government bodies (IEC, 2017). 
ISO/IEC 27001 is part of a larger family of standards – the ISO/IEC 27000 series – issued 
by the Joint Technical Committee 1 (JTC1), specialized in Information Technology standards. The 
first version of ISO/IEC 27001 was issued in 2005 and derives from the British Standard 7799 of 
1995 (renamed in 1998 as ISO 17799) (Gantz, 2013). ISO/IEC 27001 is structured in a general 
section providing comprehensive guidance to organizations on the path to assessment and 
certification, and a normative section build on detailed clauses specifying the security measures to 
be implemented. The first version of the standard consists in eleven families and 133 controls in 
the normative section.  
To obtain a certification against the ISO/IEC 27001, an organization must undergo a third-
party assessment. A continuous monitoring mechanism is required to maintain the certifications 
overtime, through receiving periodical controls and audits. The auditor verifies that the 
organization complies with the controls in the standard through an assessment following a P-D-C-
A (Plan, Do, Check, Act) cycle. The planning consists in a broader evaluation of goals and 
objectives for the assessment: the controls are defined in details and the auditor plans how to 
perform them; in the second step (Do), the auditors perform the controls selected in the first step 
to evaluate issues in the organization’s ISMS; the third step refers to the evaluation of any 
discrepancy between the best practices defined in the standard and the current status of the ISMS 
revealed during the check; the last step (Act) is the implementation of the necessary adjustments 
to the ISMS to make it compliant with the standard. The cycle repeats until the ISMS results fully 
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compliant. Although formally removed from the requirements in the newest release of the ISO 
standard, the P-D-C-A cycle is still considered as the best approach to an ISO/IEC 27001 
assessment (Watkins, 2013).  
The newest review of ISO in 2013 lowered the number of controls to 114 reorganizing 
them in eighteen categories. With the new version, the JTC1 wanted to increase interoperability 
with other standards, and make the ISO/IEC 27001 more flexible to cope with new technologies 
and newer threats, especially those stemming from the use of mobile technologies (ISO, 2013).  
There are more than 27,000 organizations worldwide currently ISO/IEC 27001 certified, 
of which more than 10,000 in Europe and less than 1,500 in North America. Interestingly, the 
number of certifications increased by more than 20% between 2014 and 2015 with the higher 
regional increase in North America with 78% (ISO, 2015). That increase is aligned with a 
consistent trend since the first publication of the standard in 2005, suggesting progressively higher 
attention to IT security certification. 
2.3.2. Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP) 
FedRAMP is a federal government-wide risk authorization management program initiated 
in the US in December 2011 with the publication of the Office Management and Budget’s (OMB) 
“Security Authorization of Information Systems in Cloud Computing Environments” 
memorandum for Chief Information Officers” (VanRoekel, 2011). FedRAMP is the result of a 
joint effort of federal agencies, local governments, academia, and non-government organization 
working together to define minimum security requirements for cloud providers to the Federal 
Government (VanRoekel, 2011). The program seeks to standardize the assessment and 
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authorization procedures for the CSPs, thereby establishing a security framework for cloud 
services in compliance with FISMA (FedRAMP, 2014). FedRAMP allows Federal Agencies to 
leverage existing authorizations according to a “do once, use many times” perspective, promoting 
savings in IT expenditure of Federal Agencies, in alignment with the provisions of the 25 Point 
Implementation Plan (FedRAMP, 2017a). 
Much like FISMA, the security assessment required for Federal IT services, FedRAMP 
assessment derives a selection of controls from the Special Publication (SP) 800-53 developed by 
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The title of this Special Publication is 
“Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations” and includes 
a total of 810 controls and control enhancements. The controls provide baseline security measures, 
while the enhancements provide additional details and strength to the control measures. The 
controls are organized in 18 families. NIST SP 800-53 considers three possible tiers, following the 
same distinction and selection described in the Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 
199 and FIPS 200. The low baseline includes controls and enhancements designed for systems 
processing limited security impact information; the moderate baseline is required for systems 
processing information with medium security impact; the high baseline includes stricter controls 
aimed at protecting information which loss could cause severe or catastrophic consequences to the 
organization to which it belongs (NIST, 2004). FedRAMP adopts the same distinction as NIST SP 
800-53, specifying controls and enhancements in three tiers. 
In its first release in 2011, FedRAMP considered only low and moderate security control 
baselines for a total of 116 and 297 controls and enhancements, respectively, distributed in 17 
families. In 2014, after the last review of the NIST 800-53 special publication, FedRAMP was 
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updated to a new version, reaching 325 total controls and enhancements for the moderate tier and 
125 for the low tier. In July 2016, FedRAMP officially released a high baseline, including 
additional 96 controls and enhancements. The FedRAMP assessment follows the NIST Risk 
Management Framework (RMF) from Special Publication 800-37. It is structured in four steps, 
the first of which embeds steps 1-3 of the original NIST Risk Management Framework 
(FedRAMP, 2014a). It consists in (1) an initial step collecting information on the system, followed 
by (2) an assessment of security requirements, (3) an authorization phase to allow the provider to 
supply services to Federal Agencies, and last (4) a continuous monitoring phase, designed to 
guarantee the continuance of the same level of security after the initial authorization.  
To obtain FedRAMP authorization to operate (ATO) and allow multiple agencies to 
leverage on the existing authorization, three distinct paths are possible. All of them require the 
involvement of a third-party assessment organization (3PAO) to act as an independent auditor, 
performing the required controls and attesting to the compliance of the Cloud Service Provider 
(CSP). The first path directly involves the Joint Authorization Board (JAB), the second involves a 
Federal Agency, and the third involves the CSP only. In each case, after the assessment of the 
3PAO is complete, the request for an ATO must be submitted to the FedRAMP Program 
Management Office that will add the authorized system to the list of compliant systems 
(FedRAMP, 2014). The first FedRAMP ATO dates back in 2013. As of March 2017, 77 systems 
have been authorized – 4 at a high level – following the three different ATO procedures, and 
another 52 are in-process. The total number of 3PAOs is 45, but only 16 have been involved in at 
least one assessment since the program started in 2011 (FedRAMP, 2017c). On the one hand, 
jurisdictional constraints certainly plays a role in limiting the numbers with FedRAMP. On the 
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other hand, the authorization process has been havily criticized for being too slow, costly for CSPs, 
and uneffective in increasing IT security (MeriTalk, 2016).  
2.3.3. Cloud Computing Compliance Control Catalogue (C5) 
The Cloud Computing Compliance Control Catalogue (C5) was presented in 2016 as a set 
of cloud-specific measures aimed at simplifying the cloud security certification landscape (Grete, 
2016). The C5 builds on the structure of ISO/IEC 27001 and SOC 2 reporting standard to assure 
complete and comprehensive protection in cloud environments (BSI, 2016). The standard is the 
result of an effort of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI–German 
Information Security Office). BSI presented the C5 as a guideline that could be used by CSPs 
independently from other standards, or as an integration to existing certifications and assessments. 
For this purpose, BSI provides a table of comparison with some of the major existing standards 
used today, such as ISO/IEC 27001, or SOC 2.  
C5 is structured in one general and eighteen normative sections, and 118 controls. The 
control requirements are built at two levels. The first is the basic level: fulfillment of the basic 
requirements is sufficient for the CSP to be compliant with the standard, assuring them a strong 
security baseline. The second level is made of additional requirements: these requirements are 
specified for part of the controls to provide higher security and privacy measures protecting 
sensitive information 
C5 constitutes one of the referencing standards for the creation of the European Secure 
Cloud (ESCloud), a cloud label which core mission is “to facilitate market players and public 
bodies gaining trust in cloud services compliant to the requirements of [ESCloud].” ESCloud is 
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built in cooperation between BSI and the Agence nationale de la sécurité des systèmes 
d'information (ANSSI), the French national cybersecurity agency (BSI, 2016a). 
2.3.4. SOC 2 
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) is a non-government 
organization founded in 1887 and working on a wide range of activities including certification and 
standardization policies. AICPA counts more than 418,000 members in 143 countries, mostly from 
the accounting profession (AICPA, 2016).  
In 1992, AICPA released the Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 70, a reporting 
standard finalized at providing support to certified public accountants in the analysis of financial 
statements of service organizations (Nickell and Denyer, 2007). The statement was designed to 
help service organizations and their clients in the exchange of information about compliance 
obligations, such as those deriving from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US, and hence facilitating 
the auditing process. However, soon after SAS 70’s release, service organizations consistently 
started to use the reports resulting from SAS 70 assessments to demonstrate to their clients the 
adoption of strong privacy and security measures, and their high attention to information assurance 
(Gartner, 2010). SAS No. 70 reports thus started to play a marketing function not planned by 
AICPA upon its release (Nickell and Denyer, 2007). 
The misinterpretation of the standard forced AICPA to review it to better fit the 
expectations of client organizations. In 2011, AICPA released the Service Organizations Controls 
reports (AICPA, 2011), a group including three kind of reports with a broader scope than SAS 
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70’s, including a marketing-oriented component and an explicit focus on security and privacy, 
other than compliance to financial regulations. 
The first reporting standard in the group, named SOC 1, is the direct successor of SAS 70, 
as it engages in controls aimed at guaranteeing the integrity of financial statements. The other two 
reporting standards in the group are SOC 2 and SOC 3, which focus on privacy and security of 
information systems and information assurance. The difference between the two is the deliverable 
of the assessment. SOC 2 contains an extensive description of the assessment and the controls 
implemented in the information system, while SOC 3 consists in a brief statement, more suitable 
for marketing purposes, rather than showing the results of an insightful analysis (AICPA, 2014). 
SOC 2 reports can be formulated in two different types: Type I gives an evaluation of controls and 
control objectives chosen by the management to promote information assurance; Type II adds the 
evaluation of the effectiveness of the chosen controls, observing the effect of their implementation 
in the system. Since a SOC 2 report contains relevant information on security measures 
implemented in the information system of the service organization, it is generally restricted to 
clients of the organization. Conversely, since it does not contain sensitive information and in 
alignment with its marketing purpose, a SOC 3 report is generally public. 
SOC 2 and SOC 3 reports are based on controls selected by the organization’s management 
and the auditors from the list of AICPA’s Trust Services Principles and Criteria (TSPC), a set of 
information assurance measures first released in 2009, and reviewed twice, in 2014 and 2016. The 
section of TSPC used as the foundation for SOC 2 and SOC 3 assessments is named TSP 100 
“Trust Services Principles and Criteria for Security, Availability, Processing Integrity, 
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Confidentiality, and Privacy.” TSP 100 has been deeply impacted by the two reviews of the TSPC 
both on its structure and the number of controls. 
There are 117 controls in TSPC 2009, divided by the principle they protect. Those 
principles are confidentiality, integrity, availability, and security. Each group contains four 
categories: policies, communications, procedures, and monitoring. The first oversees the 
production of adequate documentation of the processes implemented in the service organization; 
the second is about policy-sharing and approval across all the levels of the organization; the third, 
procedures, defines formal requirements for policies to be approved and validated; the last 
category makes sure that policies and procedures are enforced and implemented.  
TSPC 2014 deeply reviews the 2009 version, reducing the number of controls to 47, 
organized in four groups. The simplification is obtained grouping most of the controls under an 
umbrella category of common criteria protecting confidentiality, integrity, and availability, and 
organizing the remaining controls in principle-specific criteria similarly to the 2009 version. The 
goal of the revision is to simplify the assessment process for organizations and auditors. TSPC 
2016 makes additional changes to the list of controls, clarifies and optimizes them reducing the 
number of common criteria and controls specific to confidentiality, integrity, and availability to a 
total of 44.  
In addition to those principles, SOC 2 and SOC 3 reports protect privacy of information. 
However, criteria related to privacy protection are not included in TSPC 2009 and TSPC 2014. 
Until the introduction of 20 privacy-specific criteria in TSPC 2016, SOC assessments used the list 
of Generally Accepted Privacy Principles (GAPP), created by AICPA and the Canadian Institute 
of Chartered Accountants (CICA). The list is superseded by TSPC 2016.  
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2.3.5. Differences Among the Standards 
The four standards in this study show similar structures and common goals. All of them 
are built on assessments based on controls and control families. The main goal of the standards is 
to set a benchmark on privacy and security measures adopted in IT systems of service 
organizations. Still, each standard has its own peculiarities, and observing them helps giving a 
better sense of range and scope of each standard. 
The first difference is in their focus. ISO/IEC 27001 and SOC 2 are applicable to any 
organization and IT environment, regardless of whether the audited organization uses virtualized 
systems or on-premises infrastructure. FedRAMP and C5 are designed for cloud environments, 
and strictly speaking for the assessment of CSPs. Their different focus reflects on the content of 
the controls that is more general in ISO/IEC 27001 and SOC 2, more specific in FedRAMP and 
C5. 
A second difference is in the number of controls. Although with few fluctuations after each 
review, ISO/IEC 27001, SOC 2, and C5 have a comparable number of controls (114, 64, and 118, 
respectively). FedRAMP shows a higher number of controls (325 in the moderate baseline) 
suggesting more accurate description of the single measures to be implemented by the CSPs. 
Geographic distribution and number of certificates or attestations is another notable 
difference among the standards. FedRAMP is a national government standard. Its implementation 
is limited to the US and less than 80 CSPs have currently obtained a FedRAMP ATO. ISO/IEC 
27001 active certifications are 1,247 in the US, and more than 27,000 worldwide (ISO, 2015). 
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Perhaps because of their broader applicability, ISO/IEC 27001 and SOC 2 are worldwide adopted 
standards. SOC 2, however, is based on personalized reports and does not result in a certification. 
Hence, data on its diffusion and adoption are not available. The same is for C5, more recent than 
the others, which is the result of a national initiative supported by the European Commission. The 
standard is conceived as a guideline and does not offer a formal certification. Yet, C5 is gaining 
increasing attention from the major Cloud providers (AWS, 2017; Microsoft, 2017). 
The last notable difference is in the time in which the standards have been released and 
updated. ISO/IEC 27001 was the first standard to be released in 2005. Its only review was eight 
years later in 2013. TSPC, on which SOC 2 assessment is based, were released in 2009,13 followed 
by two updates in 2014 and 2016. FedRAMP was released in 2011 and updated four years later in 
2015. Its high baseline was introduced in 2016. C5 has only one version, its first release was in 
2016. 
2.4. Previous Work on IT Security Standards 
An extensive body of research literature investigates IT security standards and guidelines. 
However, previous work is limited in scope as it focuses on the technical aspects related to the 
standards, and only a limited number of studies analyze FedRAMP, SOC 2, C5, and ISO/IEC 
27001. Since fast-pacing technology changes can easily make infrastructures, as well as software 
outdated in the short period, there is a high probability that existing standards may incur in 
shortcomings, and hence considerable effort in improving standards and assuring their adequacy 
is devoted to the study of threats and issues in cloud computing. The identification of new threats 
                                                 
13 The first version of TSPC was released in 2006. However, the first relevant version for this study (the first on which 
SOC 2 is based on) is the 2009 version. Although SOC 2 was released in 2011, it based its assessment on the controls 
in TSPC 2009. For this reason, I consider in the SOC 2 timeline the three versions of TSPC: 2009, 2014, and 2016.  
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allows a timely identification of weaknesses in existing systems and process, and accurate study 
may suggest effective responses in addressing the new vulnerabilities. Reactivity and proactivity 
in the study of threats are expected in the creation and update of IT security standards, and study 
of cloud vulnerabilities is intimately related to evaluation of completeness and adequacy of 
controls and control families in current standards. 
The Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) has been active since 2008 and reviews existing 
standards and has even created its own certification (CSA, 2017). As the basis for its certification, 
CSA has produced a detailed list of controls to be adopted to guarantee information assurance in 
cloud environments. The controls produced by CSA are the result of analysis of industry-accepted 
standards, and are conceived as a complement to ISO 27001 in cloud environments (CSA, 2017a). 
CSA is adept at dealing with menaces to cloud security, periodically reviewing a list of threats 
based on surveys among experts (CSA, 2010; 2013; 2016). CSA, however, has overlooked 
connecting existing security standards with potential threats, and has left existing gaps in observed 
standards unaddressed. Adobe (2015) has developed a Common Controls Framework that enables 
Adobe’s employees to avoid replication of controls common to different security frameworks. 
Adobe has analyzed multiple cloud security standards – including FedRAMP and ISO/IEC 27001 
– to identify overlapping controls, saving time and making their implementation more effective. 
However, the goal of Adobe’s framework is to foster business efficiency and, although 
demonstrating awareness about differences and similarities among standards, does not offer 
guidance to improve them with respect to attack vectors. The Cloud Standards Customer Council 
(2013) offers an overview of major cloud standards and recommends a ten-step process for 
determining the best framework for the evaluation of cloud security. Although at each step of the 
process a reference to existing standards is provided, the guideline results in general observations 
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and does not deal with single security controls, thus offering a limited space for analyzing gaps 
among standards. 
Gikas (2010) offers a comparison between legislative acts promoting security standards for 
US Federal Agencies and private-sector standards. The author reveals overlapping controls and 
gaps among the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), used in the 
healthcare industry, the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA), covering IT 
security for Federal Agencies, the ISO 27000 series, and the Payment Card Industry–Digital 
Security Standard (PCI-DSS), defining security measures for digital payment systems. ISO/IEC 
27001 and PCI-DSS are also the focus in Rasheed’s (2014) study, which highlights how these 
standards consider infrastructure security auditing more heavily than data security, but does not 
specify additional controls to be considered for improving existing flaws. Gleeson and Walden 
(2014) widely leveraged the ETSI’s (2013) earlier survey and gap analysis of existing cloud 
standards. The authors distinguish between technical, informational, and evaluative standards, and 
identify in the latter a source for future challenges to information assurance in the cloud. 
Underpinning legal reforms may generate some confusion, however, and thus adopted standards 
may require review, which would jeopardize information assurance in the meantime. Their 
research is limited to an observation of the certification landscape, and neglects to offer specific 
directions for future work. Furthermore, they leave aside technical aspects to focus on institutional 
and legislative activities related to the standard itself. Their work is nevertheless reassuring in their 
ability to incorporate the coexistence of multiple standards.  
Of a different opinion about the effectiveness of existing standards, Sunyaev and Schneider 
(2013) consider existing certifications and standards as inadequate for fast-moving cloud 
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technologies. Additionally, and somehow echoing the concerns on market lock-in already noted 
in Dombalagian (2015), they note how it is hard for small and medium enterprises to fully adopt 
existing cloud security standards because of the associated cost, which gives a great advantage to 
big firms with larger capital. Their results are general, however, and the authors do not move 
beyond denouncing the absence of a core set of widely adopted principles. On a similar note, 
questioning the approach to information assurance through certifications or pre-determined 
security frameworks, Bayuk (2011; 2011a; 2015) argues on the inadequacy of control checklists 
in most of current standards for either the impossibility of being exhaustive covering all possible 
flaws with a single standard or, on the opposite side of the spectrum, incurring in the risk of 
adopting a standard too focused on controls inapplicable to the system being audited. She rather 
suggests to use a holistic approach to IT security and consider the characteristics and goals of the 
system, assessing its ability to satisfy security metrics defined on a case-by-case basis. The author 
proposes a new approach to security assessments going beyond standardized assessments, thus 
refusing them altogether. Although the work by Bayuk must be praised for her attempt to 
contextualize the adoption of security measures and maximize their effectiveness in relation to the 
goal of each system, she overlooks the normative function of the standards, reducing their goal to 
mere best practices, rather than regulatory instruments as suggested in Brunsson and Jacobsson 
(2000). 
Hendre and Joshi (2015) look at cloud-specific threats in literature, security requirements 
in more than 20 standards, and controls implemented by more than 100 CSPs analyzing publicly 
available sources. They develop an application able to help cloud customers choosing the CSP 
offering strongest compliance according to their needs. Although valuable in its 
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comprehensiveness, the study limits its focus to recommendations to cloud customers, being 
acritical of current security frameworks. 
Three studies focus on classifying threats to cloud security, but their classifications are not 
matched with existing standards. They thus fail to find a real-case example on which to build an 
effective evaluation. First, Ardagna et al. (2015) conduct a detailed review of academic and non-
academic work on cloud security and standardization. They classify existing work according to a 
common technique for providing cloud assurance during testing, monitoring, certification, 
audit/compliance, and SLA’s. Similarly, the second study by Fernandez et al. (2014) collects and 
reviews previous studies from academia and industry on security threats to cloud environments so 
as to offer a comprehensive overview of trends in cloud security. Third, Huang et al. (2015) review 
the current status of IaaS security through an extensive study of industrial and academic work. The 
authors isolate potential threats to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information, 
and to Contractual Security, which refers to the breach of contractual obligations by the CSP or 
the tenant, and then classify those potential threats according to the violated principle. Two more 
studies try to analyze specific standards and evaluate them in comparison, but are limited in scope 
and were performed prior to the publication of the current version of ISO/IEC 27001 and 
FedRAMP. Creese, Goldsmith, and Hopkins (2013) perform a detailed review of risk controls as 
defined by the 2005 version of ISO/IEC 27001, and the 2009 NIST SP 800-53 rev. 3. They 
recognize the inadequacy of the two sets of risk controls to address cloud security issues at the 
time of their study, suggesting how innovation in multiple areas of control is required to address 
hybrid and public cloud security. Similarly, in their gap-analysis of ISO/IEC 27001:2005, Beckers 
et al. (2013) propose a pattern-based analysis to satisfy, on the one hand, certification and legal 
requirements for non-trivial tasks and, on the other hand, cloud security requirements. Lastly, 
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among the studies investigating IT security standards, Di Giulio et al. (2017, 2017a) offer a detailed 
comparison of FedRAMP, ISO/IEC 27001, C5, and SOC 2, looking at the standards and their 
adequacy in relation to the current threat landscape, and at the evolution of the standards overtime. 
The two studies, however, limit their scope to technical aspects related to completeness and 
effectiveness of the standards, but do not expand their conclusions to explain the possible reasons 
why the standards were created and do not consider the context surrounding their creation. 
Previous research on IT security and privacy standards has adopted gap-analysis and 
classification approaches looking at the control frameworks and threats to cloud environments. 
However, in the research literature analyzed, only a few studies have been systematic and detailed 
in their observation of current security standards, while the great majority of them have dismissed 
existing standards without offering a real gap-analysis. Studies on threats, on the other hand, 
analyze the risks associated with vulnerabilities in IT environments, and many propose technical 
remedies. What most studies overlook, however, is a contextualization of those threats in the 
broader landscape of security standards adopted by the IT industry. While they focus on the 
controls adopted according to existing security standards, their conclusions are usually too generic 
to produce effective improvements. The absence of a thoughtful insight on the context and the 
function of the standards have limited the impact of the reviewed studies, thus creating the need 
for deeper understanding of the causes and consequences of the creation of multiple IT security 
and privacy frameworks.  
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CHAPTER 3: INFORMATION ASSURANCE14 
The use of cloud technology creates new risks and vulnerabilities for information 
assurance. On the one hand, the benefits coming from using elastic and flexible IT infrastructure 
allow industry and governments to reduce their expenses. On the other hand, adequate safeguards 
to privacy and security are required to make cloud services usable without risks for confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of information. Yet, higher levels of data privacy can be required to limit 
the access to the cloud market and build a protectionist strategy in favor of local service provider.  
The first step to understand potential benefits and risks of cloud computing is to define 
what cloud computing is and what it does. Second, a careful observation of current research on 
security issues and vulnerabilities in IT environments is also necessary to understand potential 
risks coming from the adoption of cloud technology. Last, a clear definition of different approaches 
to privacy is required to understand what are the limitations in the use of technology and what 
measures are adopted to protect information, as well as the possible use of strict privacy protection 
as a barrier to foreign investments. In the following sections, I will define the context of my 
research giving a sense of the main cloud security issues and different approaches to information 
assurance and privacy in the EU and the US. 
3.1. What is Cloud Computing and why does it matter? 
Before the creation of the remote access to IT systems known today as cloud computing, 
access to IT resources has been based almost entirely on proprietary infrastructure and on-premises 
                                                 
14 This Chapter includes material from previously published work. See Di Giulio, C., Sprabery, R., Kamhoua, C., 
Kwiat, K. Campbell, R., Bashir, M. (forthcoming 2017). “Cloud Security Certifications: A Comparison to Improve 
Cloud Service Provider Security”. In the proceedings of the Second International Conference on Internet of Things, 
Data and Cloud Computing (ICC 2017), Churchill College, Cambridge, UK. March 22-23, 2017. ACM Proceedings 
Series 
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systems. In this scenario, data and applications are centrally managed and processed, and single 
devices access their organization’s data through local networks (Arasaratnam, 2011). 
Organizations adopting such model needs to invest their resources in making the system work 
efficiently and securely, provide day-to-day maintenance and be prepared to face critical events, 
such as data breaches or cyberattacks, as well as natural disasters. Conversely, cloud computing is 
a service model allowing remote access to computational, storage, and processing capabilities 
leveraging on infrastructure created and managed by third parties, the cloud service providers 
(CSP).  
Cloud deployment models can be private clouds, when a single organization uses a 
dedicated infrastructure to access additional computational resources through the internet. The 
main difference between private cloud (owned by the CSP) and the traditional private 
infrastructure (owned by the organization) is in the distribution of responsibilities among actors 
interacting with the system. The organization is entirely responsible for managing private 
infrastructures, whereas the CSP is held accountable for most private cloud’s malfunctioning or 
flaws. A second model is the use of community clouds, differing from private clouds in that their 
resources are available to multiple organizations known to the users. The infrastructure is still 
maintained and managed by a CSP, but only pre-determined organizations – such as companies in 
the same holding – can use its resources. The last model is that of public cloud. It allows access to 
multiple organizations and users (tenants) unaware of co-tenants’ activity and identity 
(Arasaratnam, 2011). The reasons for choosing a public versus a private cloud depend on what the 
organization moving its services to cloud systems needs. On the one hand, privacy and security 
risks may be a motivation against the adoption of a public cloud model. The use of shared 
infrastructure could allow malicious co-tenants to access restricted information (an example is the 
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“side-channel” attack, which will be discussed in chapter five). On the other hand, the possibility 
of large economy of scale sharing the same infrastructure with multiple users makes possible for 
the CSP to offer affordable services to its tenants. Hence, access to convenient additional resources 
is a motivation to use cloud services. 
In its most common configuration, public clouds can be divided into three paradigms: 
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Software as a Service (SaaS). 
IaaS allows a tenant to utilize physical infrastructure at a standard fee, without direct costs 
associated to maintenance and physical security. The main benefit associated with IaaS is the 
opportunity for tenants to run their own software on the CSP’s system, including specific 
Operating Systems. PaaS creates a space where tenants can install their applications on 
predetermined Operating Systems. They rent a virtual machine that can be used for developing 
applications, or run compatible software. SaaS consists in the use of software applications 
dynamically allocated in the CSP’s infrastructure, with limited functionalities (Arasaratnam, 
2011). A popular example of SaaS is the use of webmail, online document editors, document 
storage.  
However, along with benefits deriving from flexibility, remote accessibility, and the 
absence of costs associated with maintenance, cloud computing does not allow the same control 
on tenant’s information as on-premises datacenters. Since information physically resides on 
infrastructure belonging to a third party (the CSP), risks for privacy and security are a common 
deterrent to the adoption of cloud models in an organization, and moving data and applications to 
cloud systems often requires trusting the CSPs and the security measures they adopt to protect 
their systems. The US government is an example of slow adoption due to privacy and security 
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concerns. In 2010, after careful evaluation of the benefits deriving from the adoption of cloud 
technology, and urging to reduce spending in IT infrastructure, the White House published the 
“Cloud First” strategy (Kundra, 2010), crafted to encourage federal agencies to move to cloud 
systems, and defining higher security requirements for CSPs supplying services to the Federal 
Government. The Cloud First strategy has led to a considerable reduction in federal expenditure 
in IT, moving the Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) from 7.1% until 2009 to 1.8% in the 
2009-2017 period (OMB, 2017, p. 288). However, the adoption of cloud services is still slow in 
the US federal government, with only 8.2% of the $ 89.9 billions for IT expenditure reserved to 
cloud services (p. 289). In addition, the US government has actively adopted only a minor 
percentage of the cloud services available on the market (FedRAMP, 2017a). 
The adoption of cloud services, however, is not anticipated to decrease in the future. 
Following a consistent increase over the years, investment in public cloud services have grown of 
the 17.2% between 2015 and 2016, and investments in IaaS have increased by 43% in the same 
period (Gartner, 2016), suggesting a trend that will hardly reverse in the future. There are two 
elements relevant to promote the adoption of cloud services. First, the possibility of saving on IT 
expenditure is certainly relevant, but also increased attention of CSPs in the adoption of privacy 
and security measures represent a second possible reason. If cloud users are reassured on 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of their data, the cloud becomes more appealing as 
compare to on-premises solutions. Two elements play a role in building up security and trust in 
cloud services: one is the understanding of threats and vulnerabilities to cloud systems, which 
represents a primary need to make these technologies secure against cyberattacks; the second is 
privacy protection, and the adoption of sufficient guarantees for users that their data are safe 
against unwanted access. 
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3.2. The Treacherous Twelve 
Standards for cloud computing environments aim to provide a minimum security baseline 
for CSPs. The goal is to improve the tenants’ level of trust in security and privacy of their processed 
or stored data. To maintain high level of confidentiality, integrity, and availability in the hosting 
systems, standards must include measures protecting against threats and security issues. Hence 
studying these threats and weaknesses is necessary to maintain a standard up-to-date. 
Among various classifications of security issues, few have been constantly updated and 
industry-sensitive as those published by CSA. Since 2010, CSA’s Top Threats Working Group 
has proposed multiple lists of threats affecting cloud environments (CSA 2010, 2013, 2016a). Last 
in the timeline is “The Treacherous Twelve: CSA’s Cloud Computing Top Threats in 2016,” a 
detailed study, based on a survey among 271 IT experts worldwide, on the top twelve issues in 
cloud security ranked in order of importance.  
CSA’s list of treacherous twelve does not distinguish the issues based on the actor 
originating them, and does not consider their technical or procedural nature. For example, some of 
the issues might stem from human error (e.g. data loss or insufficient due diligence), some others 
could generate as the result of malicious human action (e.g. data breaches, account hijacking, 
malicious insiders). At the same time, some of the issues are the result of exploitation of 
weaknesses embedded in the system (e.g. denial of service), other could descend from insufficient 
security policies and procedures (e.g. weak identity, credential and access management, abuse and 
nefarious use of cloud services).  
Data breaches are first on the list as the most common and feared issue among the 
interviewee. A breach consists in an incident involving unauthorized access to information residing 
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in the system. It can involve sensitive or confidential information, including personal identifiable 
information (PII), and could generate financial losses, or serious privacy violation. A data breach 
can result from human error or a targeted attack conducted by external actors. Looking to data 
from 2015, more than sixty-four thousand confirmed breaches took place all over the world, with 
the public sector first in the ranking with 47,237 events (Verizon, 2016).  Agents causing the 
breach may vary, and could consist in malicious software, hacking, or social engineering 
techniques, such as phishing (Verizon, 2016). The result of a breach is a disclosure of information 
to unauthorized third parties, with consequent damage for financial assets, or confidentiality of 
personal information. Second in order of importance are issues derived from weak identity, 
credential and access management. Weak passwords, certificates mismanagement, lack of two-
factors authentication, are all exploitable deficiencies. As such, they could lead to other issues and 
nefarious actions. For instance, access to confidential information could pass undetected when an 
unauthorized person uses approved credentials.  
Insecure interfaces or application programming interfaces (APIs) is third in CSA’s ranking. 
The APIs are a common system to interact with cloud technologies, making possible for cloud 
customers (tenants) to connect their applications to cloud services. To this extent, APIs and user 
interfaces are a vulnerable access point to cloud services and their exploitation by malicious 
attackers can easily expose information stored in the clouds. System and Application 
Vulnerabilities is the fourth issue, which consists in the exploit of a system’s or application’s 
weaknesses to perform illegitimate activities. The existence of bugs in software applications can 
be discovered by malicious attackers and used to access confidential information. Phishing or fraud 
are an example of account hijacking, the fifth issue on the list. The presence of malicious insiders, 
the sixth issue in CSA’s ranking, is a risk for sensitive information that can be accessed by 
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members inside of an organization. Malicious insiders refer to malicious or disgruntled employee 
using access privileges to perform unauthorized activities, an enormous risk especially when they 
may leverage on familiarity with the system to go undetected. Malicious insider generally falls 
into a broader category of threats, which is Insider Threats. It is defined as “an individual and, 
more broadly, the danger posed by an individual who possesses legitimate access and occupies a 
position of trust in or with the infrastructure or institution being targeted” (Catrantzos, 2012). 
Although not mentioned among CSA’s treacherous twelve, a different issue still related to insider 
threat is worth of mention in this section: the exploitation of unaware employees to perform illicit 
activities on a cloud system.  In this case, employees targeted by external actors are used as a 
vehicle for attacking the organization’s system. An external attacker, for instance, could infect a 
mobile device belonging to an employee of a target organization with malware, and access the 
system when the employee connects his or her device to the internal network. Seventh on the list 
are the advanced persistent threats (APTs), a set of continuous attacks running surreptitiously on 
a platform and frequently introduced by direct hacking, use of USB devices, or penetration through 
partner or third party networks. An example of APT is Stuxnet, a malware introduced into the 
Iranian industrial control system using a USB flash drive, which eventually caused relevant 
damage to the Iranian nuclear program in 2010 (Chen, 2014).  
Data loss is another common concern among the interviewee contributing to CSA’s work, 
and refers to all those events imputable to events external to an organization, such as a natural 
disaster, and not related to malicious attacks. A risk due to factors internal to the organization is 
insufficient due diligence, which represents the ninth of the treacherous twelve. Conversely, if 
weaknesses involve access and use of cloud services, organizations can be concerned about the 
abuse and nefarious use of cloud services. An example are distributed denial of service (DDoS) 
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attacks, where a malware infects multiple devices connected to a cloud system and try to produce 
an overload to make it unusable for a certain period of time. DDoS leverages on multiple devices 
and collective computing capabilities typical of distributed systems. On the other hand, when only 
one device targets the system with an overload of requests to slow it down or make it unusable to 
other users, the attack is called denial of service (DoS), which is the eleventh threat in CSA’s 
ranking. Last, shared technology vulnerabilities concern issues with the technology and 
infrastructure underlying cloud services used to offer multiple PaaS and SaaS products. 
As clarified in this paragraph, a considerable number of issues could defect security of 
information stored and processed in the cloud. Some of the examples have shown how exploitation 
of weaknesses or poor management of security practices have caused financial losses or 
jeopardized the right to privacy of cloud users.  Identification of the issues and determination of 
their possible causes is necessary to prevent them to happen. The inclusion of effective 
countermeasures in the standards is necessary to make them effective and relevant in assuring 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information in the cloud. 
3.3. Approaches to Privacy of Information 
The second element in creating a friendly environment to the adoption of cloud services 
are privacy safeguards. Higher attention to privacy controls sometimes works in disadvantage of 
industry stakeholders as it creates additional burdens requiring expensive audits and certification 
procedures. On the other hand, strong privacy measures work as a reassurance for end users on 
management and processing of their personal information. Data privacy plays a role in the 
willingness of private and public organizations to outsource their services, and on the possible 
risks involved in IT strategies involving outsourcing. In the general framework of an IT strategy, 
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an organization chooses to outsource its services for efficiency reasons, to enhance its agility, or 
reduce its operational costs. However, outsourcing also has risks; one of these is loss of control 
over data (Turban et al., 2015, p. 405). Hence, to protect personal identifiable information or data, 
organizations are less willing to outsource their services and rather organize their IT strategies with 
the use of internal resources. 
The EU and the US have two radically different approaches to privacy rights. Although a 
convergence in standards and best practices exist, regulations and policies adopted in the two 
blocks are far from being interchangeable. One example are rules on protection of personal data. 
The US, more favorable to business initiative and free market, have paid less attention to privacy 
of individuals – only recognized as civil rights –  with large benefits obtained by organizations 
adopting aggressive and invasive marketing practices. The EU, on the other hand, recognizes 
privacy as a human right, and pays high attention to personal data collection and processing, 
sometimes with burdensome rules on industry. 
General, cross-industry guidelines applicable regardless of industrial sector or country – 
the so-called Fair Information Practices (FIPs) – also exist in form of principles issued by various 
institutions, starting in the 1970s. Examples are the Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and 
Transborder Flows of Personal Data issued by the OECD in 1980. The US Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) also issued a set of recommendation in 1998 enlisting five main principles, 
including integrity and data security (FTC, 1998). In general, FIPs aim to increase consciousness 
of consumers about why their data are collected, how they are managed, and what are the measures 
implemented to promote data security and integrity.  
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FIPs, however, are general, non-binding principles, and their enforcement depends on their 
transposition in each legal system. The EU Privacy Directive bases its text on the OECD list of 
FIPs and the eight main principles contained in it. The US has a general attention to FIPs principles, 
but inconsistent application in federal and statutory laws. Furthermore, while attention to basic 
principles – such as notice and choice – is the same as in the EU, other principles are not specified 
and recommended. Wang and Kobsa (2008) summarize the main privacy principles from the most 
commonly referred guidelines in a comparison table. From Wang’s and Kobsa’s table I have 
selected the OECD guidelines from 1980, the EU Privacy Directive, the FTC Safe Harbor 
principles and FTC FIPs (table 3.1) that are being presented in this section. 
Table 3.1: Privacy guidelines/frameworks and privacy principles  
Specification → 
 
Principle ↓ 
OECD 
Guidelines 
(OECD, 1980) 
EU Directive on 
Data Protection 
(EU, 1995) 
FTC Safe Harbor 
Principles (FTC, 
2000) 
FTC Fair Info 
Practice (FTC, 
2000) 
Notice/Awareness X X X X 
Minimization     
Purpose specification X X X  
Collection limitation  X X  
Use limitation X X X  
Onward transfer  X X  
Choice/consent X X X X 
Access/Participation X X X X 
Integrity/Accuracy X X X X 
Security X X X X 
Enforcement/Redress  X X X 
Source: Wang and Kobsa, 2008. 
3.4. The US Scenario 
The EU and the US stands at two very different positions on privacy. Although among the 
first countries to develop guidelines on the protection of personal data in the 1970s, the US has 
never followed a consistent path in privacy regulation, shared among all the states. The US has a 
sectoral approach, where industry-oriented norms provide for details on personal data 
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management. State laws have only a limited range of application not being applicable at a federal 
level, and the only protection at a federal level could be found in the Fourth amendment to the US 
Constitution – protecting against search and seizure – and Tort Law protecting against intrusion 
upon seclusion as derived from William Prosser’s (1960) doctrine.  
Some sectors such as finance, healthcare, and children’s privacy, are the ones perceived as 
more at risk, and therefore covered by a higher level of protection with binding norms.15 The reason 
for a sectorial rather than a comprehensive protection could relate to market efficiency, as proposed 
by Cockfield (2010) claiming, 
The sectoral protections are often promoted under the market efficiency rationales: 
one view suggests that the market will do a better job at reaching a balance between 
commercial needs and privacy interests because it is simply good business to align 
a business’s collection practices compare with customer needs (2010, p. 56). 
It is in the interest of businesses to guarantee a lower protection level, receiving 
consequently benefits from enhanced agility. The boundaries provided by a strict regulation are a 
limit for thriving free market and free business initiative. At the same time, if the interests of under-
represented categories, people subject to higher risks, or particularly delicate interests are involved, 
other specific considerations need an assessment. As it happens with financial matters or children’s 
privacy, promotion of free market must be reduced in favor of a protectionist approach, since there 
is not a tradeoff between economic benefits for businesses and defense of human rights or 
minorities.  
                                                 
15 For example the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act in 1999 or the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 
1996 
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At a more general level, Privacy rights in the US legislative system are defined as civil 
rights. Their protection and importance is therefore equivalent to trade and business interests. 
3.5. The EU Scenario 
Conversely, in the EU privacy rights are considered as Human Rights. The detailed 
regulation followed by the EU gives little agility to business initiative, but is certainly reassuring 
for users on integrity and safety of their data.  
The Directive 95/46/EC of the EU – at a supranational, European level – provides the core 
legislation while national laws and recommendations provide specific details about the protection 
of personal data, collected in the EU, both within or outside of the EU. International guidelines 
exist on the issue, coming from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), which first published them in 1980. The guidelines are structured in different principles, 
all adopted in the cited EU Directive (Shimanek, 2001). These consist in eight different pillars, 
built to guarantee a transparent processing of personal data and easy access of their data subject to 
them. According to the principles, other than a general respect of openness and transparency of 
procedures and processes, limitations to collection without consent are imposed, which means that 
only under a specific purpose personal data can be collected and used. Furthermore, the purpose 
must be specified to the data subject before their collection takes place. National schemes are also 
required to assure data quality, which means accurate, complete and up-to-date information. To 
guarantee quality, the data holder must guarantee the data subjects with full access to their data, 
and the possibility to request correction – or even cancelation – of inaccurate information. At the 
same time, unauthorized access must be prevented, as well as data disclosure without consent of 
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the data subject. To assure the respect of the above principles, a strong control is required on 
controller and processor of the personal data. 
The core features of the EU Directive are not far from the elements considered more than 
twenty years before in the first European law on the issue, even before the OECD’s guidelines. In 
1970, the German federal state of Hesse introduced the first data protection act in reaction to the 
computerization and centralization of information held by the government. Similar regulations 
were adopted by the other member states until the formalization with the EU Directive (De Hert 
& Papakonstantinou, 2012). 
According to point 7 of the introduction to the EU Directive, it was necessary to create a 
general and common framework in order minimize the existing differences in national laws, 
harmonizing the various legal provisions existing at the time. A fragmented scenario would be 
cause of distortion in competition, and an obstacle to economic activities in the Common Area 
(Directive 95/46/EC). However, the reform did not completely achieve the expected effects at a 
transatlantic level, since perplexities from American investors kept being raised due to complexity 
and lack of orientation in the European legislative landscape. Hence in 2012, the European 
Commission announced the reform of the privacy Directive with the preparation of a Regulation. 
The Commission used a Regulation, which is immediately enforceable within the member states 
without being transposed into national law. The aim of the Regulation is to achieve, once again, 
harmonization out of a fragmented regulatory regime in 28 countries, providing at the same time 
a boost for innovation, growth and reliability in e-commerce and online services (European 
Commission, 2012). The General Data Protection Regulation was published on April 14, 2016, 
and will be effective starting by May 2018, fully replacing the Directive. One of the prominent 
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innovations that the Regulation will promote is simplification of the procedures necessary to obtain 
authorization for data collection and use, such as the notification to national authorities in case of 
automated processing. This specific provision traces back to the 1970s, when automatic data 
processes were an exception. With new technologies and widespread computing, the same type of 
processes has become extremely common, making less meaningful, if not useless, an obligation to 
notify them (De Hert & Papakonstantinou, 2012). More simplification will be also provided in the 
access to authorizations for foreign companies in processing data collected in the EU, since the 
authorization coming from the authority of one country member will be valid and applicable for 
the same activity on the whole territory of the EU. 
Although source of controversies for the possible consequences on foreign companies, 
another important innovation introduced in the Regulation is a provision on what has become 
known as the “Right to be Forgotten.” It gives to the EU citizens the right to ask for the erasure of 
data that are irrelevant or no longer necessary – or the erasure of links to them – even to foreign 
companies acting as service provider for EU citizens. The enforceability of the right shall be 
evaluated on a case-by-case basis (European Commission, 2014). 
In the EU, national laws and recommendations provide specific details about the protection 
of personal data. There are not industry-specific norms, since the same principles of the Directive 
and the Regulation are applicable to every sector, from government to healthcare or finance. 
3.5.1. Privacy – The EU drivers 
Inquiring about the reasons leading to a strict regulation, one explanation emerges looking 
to the structure of Data Protection and Privacy Rights in the EU. Primarily coming from the broad 
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interpretation of the Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) of 1953 
made by the European Court of Human Rights (Kilkelly, 2003), and more recently by explicit 
provision of the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon, Data Protection is brought to the rank of human rights. 
The high consideration for Privacy comes from history, from open wounds and violation of human 
rights in Europe during WWII. The brutality of the Holocaust, perpetrated by the Nazi regime in 
the 1940s, has seriously captured the public opinion, at the point of requiring the higher level of 
protection against abuses that favored the escalation of violence that took place. One of the 
violations was the use of census data and personal information to reconstruct racial identities, or 
the belonging to minorities, leading eventually to extermination. In the specific case, it was clear 
immediately after the WWII that processing personal data, even if collected for innocent purposes, 
could lead to identification of citizens of ethnic, religious, or other minority groups, revealing even 
concealed information. It was a risk too big for not being protected at the highest possible level 
(Singleton, 2002). After German re-unification in 1989,  the political initiatives to increase 
transparency in the institutions and guarantee equal conditions to citizens of the former two blocks 
reignited the debate on privacy. The surveillance apparatus created by the East German secret 
police (Stasi) was immediately perceived as a violation and marked as illegitimate (Sperling, 
2011), contributing even further to shape the perception of privacy rights as a fundamental right.  
3.6. Privacy – New perspectives and controversies 
On one side of the Atlantic Ocean, the EU is on its way of developing a privacy regime 
that could harmonize a fragmented framework among the member states. Moreover, the reform is 
aimed to simplify the regime of authorizations and procedures required for compliance to the EU 
legal system. Meanwhile, on the other side of the ocean, the strict regime of the EU has caused 
problems for US investors through the years, when they have been forced in a continue struggle to 
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comply with fragmented regulation and referring each time to a different authority in the member 
states. 
Besides harmonizing the EU framework on privacy, the Regulation plays a role in a bigger 
strategy. European lawmakers are pushing the US to endorse an equal level of protection in federal 
law (European Commission, 2010). The attempt is not new in the trans-continental relations 
scenario. Already considered a key issue, data flows were the subject of extensive discussion in 
the late 1990s, when the European Commission and the US government were involved in a debate 
around the structure and approach to data protection. At that time, the European Commission tried 
to convince the US for almost one year to enforce a stricter regime for data protection. Cultural 
differences and free speech divide were an obstacle for the US to be recognized as reliable under 
the Directive (Dowling, 2009). 
Lacking a broader consensus on privacy rules, the EU and the US created a tailored solution 
able to allow transatlantic commercial relations, where the single business could adopt the 
necessary actions to comply with the EU Directive on a voluntary basis. The agreement was called 
“Safe Harbor.” Although the Safe Harbor Agreement was not applicable in some areas, such as 
the financial sector, it represented an important precedent in terms of interaction between the US 
and the EU systems and enforcement of high protection standards. However, the rules contained 
in the Safe Harbor Agreement were often unattended by the US companies (European 
Commission, 2002), and the agreement was recently overturned with the C-362/14 case, brought 
in front of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) questioning on the safety and reliability of the Safe 
Harbor (Scott, 2015). In the case, the ECJ recognized the interference of the US government in 
fundamental rights of individuals when the data holder, a US based Internet Company, allowed 
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the US authorities to access EU citizens’ data to execute intelligence activities (Court of Justice of 
the European Union, 2015). 
To replace Safe Harbor, the US Department of Commerce and the European Commission 
issued in January 2016 a new program, the “Privacy Shield.” The framework of the Shield includes 
stricter obligations to US based companies. For example, additional limitations apply to data 
transfer to third parties, especially if based outside of the EU; Privacy Shield approved companies 
must include additional notice requirements in their privacy policies, and further restrictions apply 
to data retention (Goldstein et al. 2016). However, in the opinion of scholars and institutions 
(Goldstein et al. 2016, Voss 2016), the new Privacy Shield does not assure adequate protection to 
EU data, and does not include sufficient measures to comply with the GDPR. 
3.6.1. Privacy in International Trade 
Disagreement on privacy rights were also one of the themes during the negotiation of the 
Transatlantic Trade Investment Partnership (TTIP). The TTIP is a proposed trade agreement on 
services and goods between the EU and the US. Its negotiations started in 2012 trying to achieve 
regulatory harmonization between the two parties, especially by reducing non-tariff barriers to 
trade that are slowing down the exchange of goods and services (Malmström, 2014). The TTIP is 
not a traditional trade agreement as the trade barriers between the two sides of the Atlantic are 
already some of the lowest in the world and considering the level of trade between the EU and US. 
The idea behind the TTIP consists on deepening the liberalization of trade through deep 
harmonization of regulations and standards. The TTIP is based on a three pillars model: market 
access; harmonization of regulatory cooperations; rules of trade related to issues such as 
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intellectual property rights, energy, sustainable development, and so forth (De Ville, and Siles-
Brügge, 2016). 
Among all the issue areas negotiated in the TTIP, one of the most controversial has been 
on personal data flows (Renda and Yoo, 2015). By reducing the distance between their regulatory 
frameworks, the EU and the US hope to make the cross-border access to services considerably 
easier, and data flows are a significant component on trade in services, which often requires 
transmission and processing of personal information. Three years into the negotiations, the 
European Commission denied the possibility that privacy would be negotiated stating that “Data 
protection standards won’t be part of TTIP negotiations. TTIP will make sure that the EU’s data 
protection laws prevail over any commitments” (European Commission, 2015). 
Looking to past negotiations on privacy rights, the strict position of the EU suggests the 
attempt to create an international standard, a benchmark for leading a worldwide reform of privacy 
rights. The European Commission stresses how the privacy framework provided by the EU is a 
broadly recognized set of principles, rules and criteria, especially under the full recognition of the 
OECD. EU privacy standards have been set as the basis for new legislation in Asia and Africa 
(European Commission, 2010, p. 15). At the same time, the European Commission recognizes 
how the same roles are not a guideline in the US, which incorporates in its privacy roles only some 
of the basic principles of the Directive. The European Commission (2010) states that: 
The scope of these laws are very limited, leaving much information collection to 
be regulated by other rules, such as the rules against unfair or deceptive business 
practices. However, this has, if anything, served to underline the overall weakness 
of the USA model (to the extent that one can speak of a single model there). The 
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basic European principles should therefore be re-affirmed and, if anything, 
strengthened; and efforts to obtain their adoption world-wide should continue 
(p.15). 
As the EU-US controversy on privacy rights does not shrink in size and depth, the EU 
moves forward with initiatives promoting European IT development. On the one hand, the EU 
strategy is centered on demonization of US companies such as Google or Facebook, and protecting 
“EU champions against the current domination of US internet companies” (Renda and Yoo 2015). 
Comparing the thirty largest “blue-chip” German companies enlisted in the DAX index to only the 
first five largest US tech firms in the field of IT and web-based technologies – namely Apple, 
Amazon, Facebook, Google, and Microsoft – the astonishing result is a total value of $1.3 trillion 
for the former to a total value of $1.8 trillion for the latter (Fairless, 2014). Narrowing the 
observation down to cloud services, of twenty-five public cloud companies providing services in 
Europe, the first EU based company is only at the eight place, and seventeen US based companies 
control the 83% of the entire market (Barker 2016). Being European investments in IT far lower 
than the American, and being the US the first IT exporter to the EU, the boundaries created by 
strict regulation in data flows are also a possible form of protectionism in favor of developing 
European IT companies (Singleton, 2002). To enhance European investments on IT, it becomes 
necessary to reduce US investments and create opportunities for the local IT industry to grow. The 
attention shifts from a matter of human rights to the control of the Internet, with all its potential 
value as the engine for the global economy (Fairless, 2014).  
On the other hand, the EU strategy is to promote IT development initiatives among member 
states and at a pan-European level. This is the main purpose of one of the seven pillars in the 
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Europe 2020 strategy, which is the promotion of a Digital Single Market. The Digital Single 
Market strategy is built on three policy areas: first, improving access to digital goods and services, 
creating a marketplace where EU citizens can buy and sell with no additional fees; second, making 
digital technology a driver for economic growth, taking advantage of the possibilities it offers; 
third, creating a favorable environment, allowing digital networks and services to thrive with 
favorable rules and infrastructure (European Commission 2017). The creation of a Franco-German 
cloud firm is an example of initiative that fits into the third area. The effort of the French and 
German Governments in the promotion of a European Cloud started in 2015 (BMWI, 2017) in a 
joint effort of the French national cybersecurity agency (ANSSI) and the German Federal Office 
for Information Security (BSI) with the goal of “cementing Europe’s position as leader in the 
digital economy” (Gouvernement Français 2017).  
In the context of cloud services, vulnerabilities and security flaws are the first element to 
consider to build a trusted cloud. Cloud security standards must account for newer threats and 
vulnerabilities, and include among their controls adequate protection measures. A secure cloud 
can find larger adoption as it becomes more secure, and an increasing number of organizations are 
encouraged to migrate their IT services and applications from an on-premises model to cloud 
environments. Privacy of information is another element to consider when adopting cloud services. 
If confidentiality and integrity are preserved, an organization is more favorable to move its 
information to infrastructure maintained by third parties. Yet, privacy standards can be used in the 
EU as a mechanism to protect domestic investments. As a consequence, the conflict between EU 
and US on the issue is lively than ever, as the EU tries to set a standard that the US is not willing 
to recognize as such, being not beneficial for trade and business investments.  
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CHAPTER 4: ANALYZING THE STANDARDS16 
To understand the impact and effectiveness of C5, FedRAMP, ISO/IEC 27001, and SOC 
2 on cloud security, and explain the stratification of security standards in the past ten years, an 
observation of the context surrounding the standards is necessary but not sufficient. What helps 
clarify differences, strengths and weaknesses of each standard is a direct comparison of their 
provisions. 
  All the four frameworks in my study are based on controls organized in groups or families. 
Only two of the standards – ISO/IEC 27001 and C5 – are published along with the control 
measures. The other two rely on external sources: FedRAMP refers to a selection of controls in 
NIST SP 800-53, SOC 2 is based on TSPC. In my study, I evaluate the adequacy and completeness 
of security measures in the standards in relation to cloud security and the current threat landscape 
comparing the provisions in the standards to each other. For this purpose, I choose to use a third-
party checklist with a similar structure to the four standards and cloud-specific security measures, 
and compare each of the standards with it. The third-party framework used in my study is the 
Cloud Control Matrix (CCM), created by the Cloud Security Alliance. 
The first advantage in using the CCM as an external framework is its completeness and 
detailed descriptions of a comprehensive set of security controls, which allows a more detailed and 
accurate evaluation of the privacy and security measures in the standards. Second, CSA offers a 
                                                 
16 This Chapter includes previously published material. See Di Giulio, C., Sprabery, R., Kamhoua, C., Kwiat, K. 
Campbell, R., Bashir, M. (forthcoming 2017). “IT Security and Privacy Standards in Comparison: Improving 
FedRAMP Authorization for Cloud Service Providers”. To be presented at the International Workshop on Assured 
Cloud Computing and QoS Aware Big Data (WACC ‘17), Madrid, Spain. May 14, 2017. See also Di Giulio, C., 
Sprabery, R., Kamhoua, C., Kwiat, K. Campbell, R., Bashir, M. (forthcoming 2017). “Cloud Security Certifications: 
A Comparison to Improve Cloud Service Provider Security”. In the proceedings of the Second International 
Conference on Internet of Things, Data and Cloud Computing (ICC 2017), Churchill College, Cambridge, UK. March 
22-23, 2017. ACM Proceedings Series 
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third-party viewpoint, with controls that are not NIST, BSI, AICPA, or ISO/IEC specific. The 
choice of a checklist of controls to be used as an analytical framework is determined by the need 
of obtaining measurable results, by verifying how many requirements in the CCM are met by the 
other frameworks. 
In my study, I assume that CSPs certified against one or more standards adopt adequate 
policies and security mechanisms to be compliant with the standards overtime. Compliance with 
a security standard is not per se a guarantee of security, and effectiveness is also related to 
enforcement of security recommendations and best practices within an organization. 
 I limit my observation to the controls relevant in each version of FedRAMP (2011 and 
2015), and to the highest security level common to the two releases. The FedRAMP high baseline 
was released only in 2016, and hence cannot be found in 2011. Therefore, I limit the comparison 
to controls included in the medium baseline. SOC 2 is based on TSPC. Although the TSPC were 
first published in 2006, the first version referenced in SOC 2 is from 2009. I also include 
observations on the two most recent reviews, in 2014 and 2016. C5 is organized in two levels: a 
set of basic requirements, and a set of additional requirements. Since implementation of the basic 
requirements is sufficient to be compliant with the standard, I draw my numerical data from 
observation of the basic requirements. 
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To conduct my systematic analysis, I follow a sequence of four steps where I collect and 
then operate on a selection of data on security controls (figure 4.1). The first step is to collect and 
classify the requirements in FedRAMP, ISO/IEC 27001, SOC 2, and C5. Then in step two, I 
analyze the results of my comparison to identify gaps and differences. I use the categorization 
provided by CSA in the most recent version of their Cloud Control Matrix (CCM), version 3.0.1 
released in January 2016 (CSA, 2016) to combine the controls required in the four standards. The 
CCM provides a classification of security and privacy enhancements organized into 16 control 
domains, and a total of 133 single controls (Table 4.1).  
Table 4.1: CCM Control Families and Controls 
Control Family ID Control Family Name # of Controls 
AIS Application & Interface Security  4 
AAC Audit Assurance & Compliance  3 
BCR Business Continuity Management & Operational 
Resilience  
11 
CCC Change Control & Configuration Management  5 
DSI Data Security & Information Lifecycle 
Management  
7 
Figure 4.1: Methodology 
 
Source: Di Giulio et al., 2017a 
 
Figure 3: Metodology 
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DCS Datacenter Security  9 
EKM Encryption & Key Management  4 
GRM Governance and Risk Management  11 
HRS Human Resources  11 
IAM Identity & Access Management 13 
IVS Infrastructure & Virtualization Security 13 
IPY Interoperability & Portability  5 
MOS Mobile Security  20 
SEF Security Incident Management, E-Discovery & 
Cloud Forensics  
5 
STA Supply Chain Management, Transparency and 
Accountability  
9 
TVM Threat and Vulnerability Management 3 
Source: CSA, 2016 
CSA’s classification offers a direct reference to controls from the 2011 FedRAMP ATO 
requirements, from ISO/IEC 27001:2005 and 2013, and TSPC 2009 and 2014. In November 2015, 
CSA released a public consultation to update the CCM, including the new controls in FedRAMP 
2015. I include CSA’s matching of new controls from that document in consultation within my 
analysis and combine them with the others. However, since the document has not been officially 
released as an update to the CCM, I use the content referring to the newest release of FedRAMP 
as a mere guideline, and reinforce the observation with further considerations. 
In the case of C5, BSI has published a reference guide along with the official control list. I 
use this document as a first guide in matching the controls in C5 with those in the CCM. Then, I 
verify the correspondence with in-depth content analysis. The analysis builds on a full-text search 
of C5 provisions based on keywords from the controls in the CCM, and a one-by-one verification 
of controls in the CCM not matched with controls in C5. Due to high technicality and detail in the 
controls, and a certain degree of interpretation to verify the correspondence of security measures 
in different frameworks, the use of analytic tools has been precluded. The same is true for the use 
of keyword generators, largely based on quantitative principles (i.e. recurrence of a word in a given 
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sentence). Further supporting material is the NIST SP 800-53, which includes reference and 
matching to ISO/IEC 27001. Since both CCM and C5 Referencing Table have references to 
ISO/IEC 27001 and TSPC, NIST SP 800-53 represents a support to connecting FedRAMP (based 
on NIST controls), and the other frameworks.  
Similarly, TSPC are referenced in the CCM only for the 2009 and 2014 version, while 
TSPC 2016 are excluded. In this case, however, there are only minor differences between TSPC 
2014 and 2016 among common criteria and controls impacting confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability, and the only major revision is the addition of privacy criteria (AICPA, 2015a). 
Therefore, I focus only on the differences between the two most recent versions, verifying that the 
changes do not impact the correspondence to the CCM. I verify if the changes and the additional 
privacy criteria compensate for the controls missing in the matching of TSPC 2014 using the same 
keyword-based full text search adopted for C5. 
In the third step, after matching the controls on the CCM, I operate a further selection on 
the controls missing from the comparison, skimming on the less relevant to concentrate on the 
most compelling ones. To evaluate the relevance of each control, I rely on the definition of threats 
to cloud environments and their severity as defined in the literature, and especially the list of threats 
identified with CSA’s publication “The Treacherous Twelve,” which is natively integrated with 
CSA CCM. Concentrating on the controls lowering the risk coming from one or more of the 
Treacherous Twelve, I obtain a more accurate evaluation of effectiveness, as well as the 
completeness of ISO/IEC 27001, C5, SOC 2, and FedRAMP against the requirements suggested 
in CSA CCM. 
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In the last step, as I analyze the missing controls in details, I go through the additional 96 
controls and enhancements in FedRAMP high baseline – only available after July 2016 – to verify 
to what extent they can mitigate the deficiencies in FedRAMP 2015 moderate baseline. The final 
result is a selection of security requirements missing in FedRAMP moderate and high baseline, 
C5, SOC 2 based on TSPC 2016, and ISO/IEC 27001:2013, with the potential of creating security 
flaws in cloud environments. 
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CHAPTER 5: STANDARDS IN COMPARISON17 
In this chapter, I present the findings of my empirical study of C5, FedRAMP, ISO/IEC 
27001, and SOC 2. I detail the mismatches, and their evolution over time, in the mapping between 
the available versions of the standards and the CCM. I refer to missing controls as the controls in 
the Cloud Control Matrix used as the analytical framework (See Table 4.1). After presenting the 
quantitative results, I move to discuss them in the context of cloud security and in relation to the 
current threat landscape. I discuss the controls omitted in the four standards following a basic threat 
model, where the possible threats stemming from missing security measures are presented and 
organized. The threat modeling gives a more concrete dimension to the omissions in the standards, 
helping a better understanding of possible vulnerabilities resulting from the adoption of the 
standards and their gaps. 
The three versions of TSPC, published in 2009, 2014, and 2016, show 43, 47, and 39 
omissions, respectively, out of 133 controls in the matrix. In proposing its own matching over the 
CCM, CSA presents 48 controls omitted in TSPC 2014. However, the control Identity & Access 
Management, Credential Lifecycle/Provision Management (IAM-02), which prescribes adequate 
identity management policies, is satisfied in TSPC 2014 and identical controls in TSPC 2016 
(Section CC5 of the TSPC).  FedRAMP rev. 3, released in 2011, shows 45 omissions. In contrast, 
the CSA’s matching claims that there are only 44 omissions in total. However, after a careful 
review, the control Data Security & Information Lifecycle, Data Inventory/Flows (DSI-02) 
                                                 
17 This Chapter includes previously published material. See Di Giulio, C., Sprabery, R., Kamhoua, C., Kwiat, K. 
Campbell, R., Bashir, M. (forthcoming 2017). “IT Security and Privacy Standards in Comparison: Improving 
FedRAMP Authorization for Cloud Service Providers”. To be presented at the International Workshop on Assured 
Cloud Computing and QoS Aware Big Data (WACC ‘17), Madrid, Spain. May 14, 2017. 
58 
 
appears to be signaled as fulfilled in FedRAMP 2011 by mistake, since the control signaled as 
adequate in FedRAMP does not relate to DSI-02.18  
Compared to its older version, the 2015 release of FedRAMP shows a significant 
improvement. However, it still omits 30 controls from the CCM. ISO/IEC 27001 satisfies all but 
43 controls in its 2005 release and 3 controls in the 2013 version (Figure 5.1). 
C5, although building on the ISO certification and TSPC to define its own set of criteria, 
shows as many as 30 omitted controls across multiple control domains. 
Interestingly, two control domains are completely or substantially omitted in most of the 
analyzed frameworks. The first domain is Mobile Security (MOS). ISO/IEC 27001:2013 is the 
                                                 
18 The control DSI-02 in the CCM is named “Data Security & Information Lifecycle Management - Data Inventory / 
Flows” and requires full documentation of data flows of the organization. The control in FedRAMP 2012 signaled as 
matching is SC-30, which is named “Concealment and Misdirection” and relates to the reduction of the attack surface 
of the system by using concealment and misdirection techniques such as randomness or virtualization.  
Figure 5.1: Total Missing Controls and Relevant for the Treacherous Twelve 
 
Source: Di Giulio et al., 2017a 
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only framework that addresses it in its entirety. The 2015 release of FedRAMP and C5 satisfy only 
six out of twenty controls from that domain. None of the other frameworks include measures from 
MOS. The second domain is Interoperability and Portability (IPY). ISO/IEC 27001:2013 includes 
all the controls from that domain, and C5 omits only one control. None of the other frameworks 
include any of the controls from IPY. 
In the control domain Supply Chain Management, Transparency and Accountability 
(STA), the referred frameworks show significant gaps, except for ISO/IEC 27001:2013 and C5, 
which cover all security requirements, and TSPC 2016, which omits only 2 of them. 
The number of gaps and omissions indicated thus far, however, is substantially reduced 
when the analysis includes the relevance of the omitted controls according to their impact on at 
least one of the Treacherous Twelve. Including a consideration on threats and vulnerabilities, it 
becomes possible to focus on the most significant controls and obtain a more realistic view of the 
impact of each framework in terms of security and privacy of information hosted in the cloud. 
Once the selection applies, the average drop in the number of omitted controls is close to 
68%, with a peak of nearly 83% for FedRAMP 2015, which goes from 29 omitted controls to only 
5. ISO/IEC 27001:2013 registers the lowest decrease, 33%, in going from 3 to 2 omitted controls. 
ISO/IEC 27001:2005 and FedRAMP 2011, with a drop of slightly more than 75%, still omit 10 
and 11 controls respectively. FedRAMP and ISO show lower numbers of omitted controls in their 
newer versions. TSPC, on the contrary, show a fluctuation suggesting that the older version (from 
2009) offers better protection than the newer ones. The TSPC from 2009, 2014, and 2016 omit 10, 
16, and 12 controls, respectively. C5 shows an almost 76% decrease, dropping the number of 
omitted controls from 30 to 7.  
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Focusing on the controls relevant for the Treacherous Twelve, the absence of controls in 
the MOS and IPY domains largely accounts for the drop in numbers of missing controls. The same 
absence justifies the limited variation in ISO/IEC 27001:2013 that covers both domains.    
Last, narrowing the observations to the most recent version of each framework, there is an 
absence of significant overlap among all four standards with respect to the omitted controls that 
concern the Treacherous Twelve. Certainly, the small number of omissions in ISO (2 controls) 
reduces the possibility of overlap. Still, limiting the observation to TSPC, FedRAMP, and C5, it 
looks like only one control is missing in the area of virtualization security (IVS). Two controls are 
missing in both TSPC and FedRAMP in the area of virtualization security and information 
lifecycle management. One control is missing in both ISO and TSPC in the area of virtualization 
security (Figure 5.2). 
 
Figure 5.2: Venn's Diagram of omitted controls overlapping in the four standards 
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5.1. Discussion 
Observing the results of the analysis, it stands out how the different versions of the four 
frameworks have been released at different times, with different frequencies, over the span of 
eleven years since 2005 (Figure 5.3). In its first issue, ISO/IEC 27001, the first of the four to be 
published, shows results comparable to those of all the other standards. While at first it showed 43 
omitted controls, after narrowing the selection based on the Treacherous Twelve, the number went 
down by over 75%. The improvement between the first and last versions of ISO is particularly 
noticeable, ending in a total of only 3 omitted controls. This improvement must be attributed 
primarily to the inclusion of controls on mobile security and interoperability, which helps fulfill 
the requirements in the MOS and IPY domains, accounting for a combined total of 25 controls. 
The same improvement cannot be seen in the other standards, which are unable to cover the 
mentioned control domains thoroughly, even in their newest versions. At the same time, the 
newness of a standard does not necessarily play a role in the reduction of omitted controls and 
improvement of coverage against threats and vulnerabilities. While ISO is a clear example of 
improvement over time, and FedRAMP also shows good progress, the TSPC are an exception. In 
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the same vein, the introduction of C5 in 2016 did not bring a drastic improvement, especially 
compared to the progress made three years earlier with the revision of ISO. 
A good improvement in TSPC can be found in the transition between the 2014 and 2016 
versions by looking at both the total omitted controls and only the ones relevant to the Treacherous 
Twelve. AICPA introduced a new set of privacy criteria in the last release, thus providing a more 
accurate set of criteria and controls. What is startling, however, is the regression of TSPC from 
2009 to 2014, and how the improvement with the 2016 publication was not enough to restore the 
good performance of the 2009 version, especially with respect to the Treacherous Twelve-relevant 
controls (12 missing in 2016, versus 10 in 2009). The reason might be the radical reorganization 
of the framework in its 2014 release, which made the content of the criteria more general and 
abandoned well-defined details that had matched the controls in the CCM. 
After narrowing down the observation to the current version of each framework, and 
focusing the attention to the most relevant security issues with respect to the Treacherous Twelve 
Figure 5.3: Timeline of omitted controls (total) in the four standards 
 
Source: Di Giulio et al., 2017a 
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selection criteria, it stands out that nineteen controls in the CCM are not addressed by any of the 
frameworks. Two controls are omitted in TSPC, FedRAMP, and C5; two controls are omitted in 
TSPC and FedRAMP; and one is omitted in TSPC and ISO (Figure 5.2). As noted earlier, two 
control domains, MOS and IPY, although not considered relevant for the Treacherous Twelve, are 
missing or considerably affected by omissions in C5, TSPC, and FedRAMP. However, controls in 
MOS are extremely relevant for information assurance. Mobile devices are a common target of 
cyberattacks, and their vulnerabilities are easily exploitable to obtain unauthorized access to cloud 
systems (see paragraph 4.1.3). For this reason, in spite of the absence of mobile security measures 
among the controls involved in the Treacherous Twelve selection, I include consideration of their 
omission in my detailed analysis. 
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The threat model used to organize possible attack vectors in this study accounts for the 
omitted controls and organizes them according to the vulnerabilities they may generate in cloud 
environments. At a higher level, three main possible sources of the threat specify the level at which 
the attack can be perpetrated: tenant, virtualization, or cloud. At a lower level, omitted controls are 
distributed according to the threat they are meant to restrain (Figure 5.4). 
5.1.1. Tenant-Level Attacks 
The first group of attacks is perpetrated through traditional vectors. In this category, an 
attacker can target information processed and stored in cloud environments or through on-premises 
Figure 5.4: Attack model based on omitted controls 
 
Source: Di Giulio et al., 2017a 
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hardware and software with no distinction. An example is unauthorized physical access into a data 
center hosting confidential information. The attacker acts directly on the hardware components of 
the system regardless of the service model (cloud or non-cloud). Other than physical security, 
threats belonging to this class typically stem from software vulnerabilities of single virtual 
machines (VMs), thus falling under the responsibility of the tenant and being excluded from 
considerations on security certifications of cloud vendors. CSPs, on the other hand, may offer 
additional security measures including, but not limited to, malware detection to improve security 
of the single VMs (Jiang et al., 2007; Jones et al., 2006; Jones et al., 2008; Lamps et al., 2014; 
Payne et al., 2008). However, the existing work on those measures is not stable enough to be part 
of a certification standard addressing full responsibility on CSPs, and must be excluded from this 
study. 
Identity management is another problem. Two controls omitted in TSPC are Identity & 
Access Management, Policies and Procedures (IAM-4), and Identity & Access Management, User 
Access Reviews (IAM-10). These controls may facilitate the circumvention of access privileges, 
thus generating a flaw. The two controls oversee the management of tenants’ identities used to 
authenticate to the cloud services, in terms of their storage, attribution, and updates of access 
privileges associated with them. One of the possible consequences could be the exploitation of 
misattributed access privileges by a tenant’s employee—thus, insider threats—to obtain 
unauthorized access to data stored in the cloud. 
5.1.2. Virtualization-Level Attacks 
In the second group, there are attacks perpetrated at the virtualization level. An example 
are those attacks that leverage sharing of infrastructure to access or infer information belonging to 
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other co-hosted tenants. “Side-channel” attacks are one instance in which, in spite of lacking direct 
access to (or authorization to access) information being processed in the system, an attacker could 
infer that same information by analyzing the CPU usage of the system by other tenants (Hendre 
and Joshi, 2015; Liu et al., 2015; Rasheed, 2014; 2014a). To protect against such attacks and adopt 
effective countermeasures, a CSP must be aware of the information flows within the system, and 
thus be able, for instance, to identify recurrent traffic patterns and reschedule some activities to 
mitigate peaks in usage and consequently reduce the risk of undesired detection of particular 
activities. At the same time, the identification, documentation, and analysis of data flows allow the 
CSP to identify high-risk environments where more specific countermeasures can be applied. 
These security procedures are specified in two controls omitted in TSPC. One of them is also 
missing in ISO, and the other in FedRAMP. Data Security & Information Lifecycle Management 
- Data Inventory/Flows (DSI-02), omitted in FedRAMP and TSPC, requires the CSP to document 
data flows in the system for the entire information lifecycle. The control omitted in ISO and TSPC 
is Infrastructure & Virtualization Security, Network Architecture (IVS-13), which refers to the 
adoption of defense-in-depth techniques against network-based attacks. The absence of these two 
controls in ISO and FedRAMP reflects the nature of the two standards, with ISO being more 
oriented towards integrity of procedures and processes, while FedRAMP is more detailed in the 
use of technical measures to assure information confidentiality, integrity, and availability. 
Conversely, TSPC misses both aspects and does not include either documentation or technical 
measures, thus opening up important vulnerabilities.   
Side-channel attacks directly target a co-hosted fellow tenant, but are not based on direct 
access to third-party information; rather, the exploitation of vulnerabilities in the virtualization 
stack allow an attacker to gain direct access to information belonging to other tenants. Information 
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can be obtained through a direct attack on the CSP, as in the case of APTs (Fernandez et al., 2014), 
or escalation of access privileges (Ormandy, 2007). Of the controls in the CCM, three would 
mitigate those vulnerabilities. Infrastructure & Virtualization Security, Vulnerability Management 
(IVS-05), which is missing in C5, TSPC, and FedRAMP, requires virtualization awareness of the 
assessment tools used by the CSP. Since the application requirements in cloud environments are 
different from those in non-virtualized systems and the virtualization technology itself needs to be 
audited, virtualization awareness is necessary to guarantee detection of existing vulnerabilities 
(Beckers et al., 2013). The second control, which is missing from FedRAMP and TSPC, must be 
read in context, and applied on a case-by-case basis; it is Infrastructure & Virtualization Security 
OS Hardening and Base Controls (IVS-07), which requires the implementation of technical 
controls and hardening techniques to protect each operating system. It can be seen as mainly a 
concern of the tenant, in that the provider maintains responsibility only for guaranteeing a security 
baseline, including a range of tools and applications to allow the tenant to meet the security 
requirement. However, in specific situations, the implementation of the control could be fully the 
responsibility of the provider, rather than the tenant. For example, that would be the case if PaaS 
applications were used to manage computing resources automatically, independent of the code 
supplied by the tenant (AWS, 2016), or such as in the case of Docker Containers (Docker, 2015). 
If the tenant is held responsible, the omission of such a control in FedRAMP is mitigated by other 
federal measures (external to FedRAMP), such as the Federal Information Security Management 
Act (FISMA). We must keep in mind that FedRAMP is a US requirement, and concerns cloud 
services for the Federal Government. FISMA requirements, which are generally applicable to 
federal information systems, also apply to the operating systems used in cloud environments if 
under the responsibility of the tenant. Conversely, TSPC were not designed specifically for federal 
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agencies, and their shortcomings are not necessarily mitigated by complementary government 
requirements. If there is a SOC 2 audit based on TSPC, a more careful evaluation of the distribution 
of responsibilities, and of the measures implemented to maximize security of the VM hosted on 
the cloud, must be done. 
The last control in this first class, which is omitted only in C5, is Security Incident 
Management, E-Discovery & Cloud Forensics - Incident Response Legal Preparation (SEF-04). 
This control relates to forensic analysis after a security incident, and requires the involvement and 
participation of the victimized tenant. The main impact of this control is on the transparency of the 
CSP towards tenants, enabling them to take adequate countermeasures when a security incident 
occurs. This requirement is not among the basic controls in C5, but other requirements in the 
standard compensate for its absence. 
5.1.3. Cloud-Level Attacks 
Two classes of vulnerabilities are part of the last group of threats in the threat model: SaaS 
and PaaS misconfigurations, and insider threats.  
The class of SaaS and PaaS misconfigurations includes configuration flaws exploitable by 
an attacker to gain access to information stored in the cloud, bypass existing security measures, or 
remove the signs of an attack to remain undetected by the CSP. Identity & Access Management, 
Audit Tools Access (IAM-01) requires restricted access to audit tools to prevent disclosure of and 
tampering with log data. The omission of this control in ISO could generate a flaw in the review 
and analysis of security incidents. If log data are tampered with, violations could go unnoticed, 
and necessary repairs be missed. The absence of one control in TSPC could enable undesired 
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access to cloud data. Encryption & Key Management, Storage and Access (EKM-04) refers to the 
use of adequate data-encryption and secure management of encryption keys, and imposes a 
technical measure for information assurance enhancement. The absence of this control would open 
up a vulnerability that could be exploited by generic attackers to obtain encryption keys, and would 
be a risk with respect to insider threats as well. If keys are stored at a cloud level, a CSP employee 
could obtain access to them, thus breaking security measures implemented by the tenant. 
The second class of vulnerabilities consists of insider threats (see section 2.2). An attack 
could be perpetrated directly by a CSP’s employee, or an employee could be the vehicle by which 
information hosted by a CSP is targeted. Among the controls useful for giving protection against 
such threats, Identity & Access Management, Trusted Sources (IAM-08) requires the adoption of 
the least privilege rule to access user identities and is omitted in FedRAMP. Two of the possible 
consequences of this omission are account hijacking, and the presence of malicious insiders 
(Beckers et al., 2013). In addition, among the provisions of NIST SP 800-53 which constitutes the 
reference checklist for FedRAMP, the US Federal standard does not consider Appendix G.  
Countermeasures outlined in that section, including the use of an insider threat handling team, 
would reduce the risk deriving from the omission of IAM-08, but are not included in the standard.  
Similarly, the control Infrastructure & Virtualization Security, Hypervisor Hardening 
(IVS-11) is missing in TSPC. This control requires stricter control of access to all the hypervisors, 
and its absence—which is not compensated for by other measures in the standard—may facilitate 
unauthorized access by CSP employees to applications and data. In addition, Governance and Risk 
Management, Management Program (GRM-04), and Governance and Risk Management, Policy 
Impact on Risk Assessments (GRM-08) are also missing in TSPC. Those two controls require the 
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creation of an Information Security Management Program and detailed security policies (GRM-
04), and mandate constant updates of those policies following periodic risk and security 
assessments (GRM-08). Their absence, although not directly causing a loss or disclosure of data, 
can weaken the protection framework implemented by the CSP through the absence of security 
updates to the internal procedures and periodic checks to their effectiveness. Procedural flaws and 
missing updates to internal procedures following technical changes to a system could be exploited 
by a malicious insider to remain undetected. In a similar vein, the absence of Infrastructure & 
Virtualization Security, Change Detection (IVS-02) from TSPC could enable tampering with data. 
If changes to the VM images are to be made, adequate notice to the tenant must be given and 
archiving of logs performed by the provider. Failure to perform the notification could result in 
failure of necessary patches in an application or integrations to the VM, resulting in undetected 
vulnerabilities. An example could be a malware injection from a malicious insider that, in the 
absence of updates, could go undetected (Huh et al., 2013). 
C5 shows five omissions relevant to the class of insider threats, and three of them are 
related to screening procedures involving CSP employees and clearance to enter CSP facilities. 
First on the list is the control Datacenter Security - Unauthorized Persons Entry (DCS-08), which 
oversees circulation of people between different areas within the CSP facilities. Although the 
control is mitigated by the inclusion of an additional requirement in C5, the baseline control does 
not require isolation of service areas and data storage, hence opening a flaw in physical access 
authorization. Once a subject has been authorized to access the service area, he or she could have 
access to the data center as well, potentially causing a security incident. Although the absence of 
this control could be disruptive if malicious attackers introduced themselves into the CSP facilities, 
access control and screening mechanisms are in place in C5, reducing the impact of the absence. 
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Still, CSP personnel should be authorized to enter only the areas of a facility that are relevant to 
their areas of competence. Second on the list is a control on identity management. Human 
Resources - Background Screening (HRS-02) requires that background screening of employees be 
adequate and proportional to the sensitivity of information accessed in the system. If this control 
is omitted, employees could maliciously bypass access restrictions, and act on the system beyond 
the boundaries for which they are authorized. Background checks are included in C5, but 
proportionality is included only among the additional requirements. The third missing control is 
Human Resources - Employment Termination (HRS-04). C5 does not clearly specify policies and 
procedures for the event that an employee is terminated or his or her functions are changed. 
Following such an event, an adjustment in access privileges and restrictions must be applied; 
otherwise, the benefits of implementing precautions based on access level differentiation could 
easily be vanquished. The fourth control omitted in C5 is Business Continuity Management & 
Operational Resilience – Policy (BCR-10). It requires the CSP to set detailed IT governance 
policies and to train employees on the requirements imposed by those policies. Although C5 
includes provisions on governance policies, it does not clearly define roles and responsibilities, 
nor does it mandate training for employees following the release of IT governance policies. The 
absence of such a requirement is made worse by the omission in C5 of another control, namely 
Human Resources - User Responsibility (HRS-10), which is generally oriented towards CSP 
employees’ awareness of procedures and policies. The resulting information and awareness gap 
suffered by the employees could become the origin of violations and the cause of vulnerabilities. 
Last, the absence in FedRAMP, C5, and TSPC of multiple controls from the domain of 
Mobile Security (MOS) cannot be overlooked. Attackers can target CSP employees’ mobile 
devices by exploiting vulnerabilities in the mobile devices’ operating systems. For example, the 
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“Stagefright” exploit can use MMS to infect other devices (Drake, 2015; Goodin, 2016). At the 
same time, specific vulnerabilities in Android can be exploited to access restricted corporate 
network resources (Perception Point, 2016; Goodin, 2013). Furthermore, mobile devices based on 
Android, a Linux-based operating system, are vulnerable to recently discovered flaws such as the 
“DirtyCOW” (Goodin, 2016). FedRAMP, C5, and TSPC show some important omissions in 
Bring-Your-Own-Device (BYOD) policies, and the lack of prudent controls on employee-owned 
mobile devices can be a source of vulnerabilities for a CSP. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
The assessment of FedRAMP, C5, SOC 2, and ISO/EC 27001 on the analytical framework 
provided by the 133 controls in the CCM shows considerable gaps. Although patches and 
improvements have been introduced with the revisions occurring to the standards over the years, 
multiple threats could be created and vulnerabilities exploited at a tenant, virtualization, and cloud 
level. Narrowing down the analysis to the most relevant controls in the CCM, selected according 
to their connection to the Treacherous Twelve issues in cloud computing presented by CSA, the 
number of mismatches drops considerably. Yet, the standards still show gaps and shortcomings. 
Of 133 controls in the CCM, 82 are considered relevant for the Treacherous Twelve: only 63 
controls are currently addressed in all the four standards, while 19 controls are missing in one or 
more of them. The first important consideration is on the type of protection that the four standards 
guarantee. As long as roughly 77% of the core security measures (63 of 83 controls) are the same, 
there is not a substantial difference in their purpose or security goal. FedRAMP, ISO/IEC 27001, 
SOC 2, and C5 all aim at creating a baseline security in IT environments. Nonetheless, there is 
significant complementarity among the four standards. Of nineteen controls missing in the 
matching, only four are missing in more than one standard (see figure 5.2), highlighting interesting 
differences in the approach to cloud assurance. FedRAMP is a US Federal authorization, and must 
be looked in context. Controls missing in FedRAMP could be compensated by other regulations, 
such as FISMA, which requires further security measures to Federal Agencies using IT systems. 
Still, FedRAMP’s provisions show high priority to technical protection measures, but less attention 
to policies and procedures that the CSP must approve and enforce. The requirements in TSPC, 
used for SOC 2 assessments, result sometimes too general and do not guarantee adequate security 
and privacy to data residing in cloud environments. There are multiple vulnerabilities not covered 
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with SOC 2 audits in different areas. Trying to be comprehensive and versatile, SOC 2 fails to 
protect against specific vulnerabilities. In line with it, SOC 2 did not benefit of the update of TSPC 
in 2014 with their reorganization into general categories and substantially reducing the number of 
controls, and still obtaining only minor improvements with the 2016 review. ISO/IEC 27001 is 
similarly general in its scope, and demands high attention to policies and procedures of the service 
organization. Yet, ISO/IEC 27001 includes detailed technical controls, and its provisions are 
adequate and up-to-date in relation to the current threat landscape. Its attention to threats and 
vulnerabilities is clearly shown in its 2013 update, when mobile security and new technologies, 
such as cloud computing, were strongly considered, and that helped the standard to improve 
dramatically. Last, C5 is designed to work for cloud security either as a complement to existing 
standards, compensating for missing security measures, or as a stand-alone checklist. It performs 
well as a complement: unlike SOC 2, but similar to FedRAMP, C5 compensates for the two 
controls missing in ISO/IEC 27001, protecting against misconfigurations and Side Channel 
attacks. Still, as a stand-alone certification C5’s shortcomings cannot go unnoticed. Human 
resources and identity management are two areas of improvement where insider threat represents 
a possible security risk.  
The overall assessment of the four standards reveals that they guarantee high protection 
when used in combination. A CSP compliant with multiple standards at the same time is more 
likely to have full coverage against threats and vulnerabilities. On the one hand, it justifies the co-
existence of the four standards. Assurance framework can compensate one another for omitted 
controls when each has a specific area of strength. On the other hand, the four standards are 
perfectible with the addition of only a few integrations. Other than more attention to mobile 
security, only eleven controls are missing in SOC 2, six controls are omitted in C5, four in 
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FedRAMP, and two in ISO/IEC 27001. Perhaps, covering that “extra-mile,” and introducing the 
missing security measures could be not hard to do. At the same time, it would make the standards 
more robust. 
Still, if complementarity of the standards justifies their coexistence, it does not provide a 
justification for the creation of new ones when a combination of existing frameworks offer 
adequate protection. Looking to SOC 2, ISO/IEC 27001, and FedRAMP, they offer already full 
coverage of the CCM criteria (see figure 5.2), and they were issued long before the publication of 
C5. Although cloud security criteria are not based on jurisdiction, some may argue that FedRAMP 
is a US Government standard, thus not applicable outside of the US. Still, FedRAMP is based on 
NIST SP 800-53 and its security measures, which are universally applicable. Not only does C5 fail 
in recognizing the existence of FedRAMP, but also ignores NIST SP 800-53.   
 Once again, the results of the analysis of standards must be looked in context. Perhaps, 
similarly to what happens with privacy policies and the European protectionist approach, the 
reason why the EU promoted the creation of a new cloud security and privacy standard with C5 is 
to contain the US predominance of European IT markets, rather than improve security and cloud 
assurance. The additional burden of a certification on US-based companies plays a role in the 
broader context of market regulation. A comparable example is the case of document formats 
presented in chapter three, where the risk of an abuse of dominant position required a regulatory 
intervention to open up the market and avoid a lock-in effect. In a similar vein, in the context of 
cloud services, US-based companies could be stopped only with an intervention of the institutions, 
creating regulatory constraints able to allow market access to other players initially excluded or 
forced to comply with rules dictated by bigger companies. In this context, initiatives in support of 
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less established tech companies is key. The creation of cloud labels such as European Secure Cloud 
is intimately connected with the publication of C5, and denial of external standards, such as 
FedRAMP, offering the necessary improvement to the protection of existing international 
standards, plays a role as well. 
The results of the empirical analysis on the effectiveness of the newer standard promoted 
by the EU for cloud assurance, however, is not reassuring for the quality and comprehensiveness 
of protection that the standard guarantees. Although the EU has relied on the expertize of 
specialized agencies such as BSI, the result is not completely satisfactory for privacy and security. 
Standards issued prior to C5 are already a sufficient guarantee, and the creation of an additional 
standard does not appear fully justified, if not for campaigning in a “turf war” against US 
companies for the dominance of the EU digital market. 
6.1. Future perspectives 
The adoption of C5 as a stand-alone certification is not sufficient to guarantee information 
assurance in cloud environments. BSI and EU institutions must be aware of its shortcomings and 
be proactive in reducing its gaps to guarantee full protection against current vulnerabilities. On the 
other hand, the adoption of the standard as a complement to ISO/IEC 27001 produces important 
improvements to the certification process, compensating for the missing controls. As the number 
of ISO/IEC 27001 certifications in Europe is almost seven times bigger than the number of 
certifications in North America, if C5 was exclusively used in combination with the ISO/IEC 
standard, still cloud service offering in the EU would largely remain a prerogative for EU 
companies. It does not necessarily mean complete exclusion of US tech firms from competition in 
the market for cloud services, since their EU datacenters and headquarters are most likely ISO/IEC 
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27001 certified, thus accounting for the 10.000 and more European certifications. Exclusion of 
transatlantic data flow in the access to cloud resources, however, represents a contradiction in 
terms with the cloud paradigm, and at the same time restrains smaller firms from accessing the EU 
Digital Single Market. A first step for US tech-companies to fill the gap that the EU initiatives are 
creating could be a more widely adoption of ISO/IEC 27001 certification and then move towards 
C5 compliance. In this perspective, US-based CSPs could increase their appeal to EU tenants 
regardless of the location of their data centers. Still, compliance with security standards is not 
enough. To allow US companies to provide their services across the Atlantic, the US Government 
and the European Commission should negotiate a convincing privacy framework. The existing 
Privacy Shield does not offer adequate guarantees, and the echo of the Schrems case C-362/14 
(see section 3.6) is still strong in the EU, jeopardizing credibility of and trust in US firms. 
However, the US Government is not taking any visible steps towards the adoption of a 
more conservative privacy stance, and is rather repealing existing protection measures (see section 
2.2). This scenario could represent a unique opportunity for the EU to move forward in creating 
its own secure cloud. Still, it is important that the European Single Market remains open to US 
investments, since it is still largely based on US services. A sudden attempt to influence the market 
of cloud services, for example imposing compliance with C5 to process specific type of data, like 
FedRAMP in the US, could represent a damage for EU businesses and governments because of 
inefficiency and migration costs.   
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